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Dividing attention impairs metacognitive control more than monitoring
Students consistently report multitasking (e.g., checking social media, texting, watching Netflix) when studying on their own (e.g., Junco & Cotton, Computers & Education, 59[2], 505–514, 2012). Multitasking impairs explicit learning (e.g., Carrier, Rosen, Cheever, & Lim, Developmental R...
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
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Springer US
2021
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8205317/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34131889 http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13423-021-01950-9 |
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author | Peng, Yaoping Tullis, Jonathan G. |
author_facet | Peng, Yaoping Tullis, Jonathan G. |
author_sort | Peng, Yaoping |
collection | PubMed |
description | Students consistently report multitasking (e.g., checking social media, texting, watching Netflix) when studying on their own (e.g., Junco & Cotton, Computers & Education, 59[2], 505–514, 2012). Multitasking impairs explicit learning (e.g., Carrier, Rosen, Cheever, & Lim, Developmental Review, 35, 64–78, 2015), but the impact of multitasking on metacognitive monitoring and control is less clear. Metacognition may compete with ongoing cognitive processing for mental resources (e.g., Nelson & Narens, The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 26, 125–141, 1990) and would be impaired by dividing attention; alternatively, metacognition may require little attention (e.g., Boekaerts & Niemivirta, Handbook of Self-Regulation [pp. 417–450], 2000) and would not be impacted by dividing attention. Across three experiments, we assessed the influence of divided attention on metacognition. Participants made item-by-item judgements of learning (JOLs) after studying word pairs under full or divided attention (Experiment 1) and made restudy choices (Experiments 2 & 3). Dividing attention had little impact on the resolution of learners’ metacognitive monitoring, but significantly impaired calibration of monitoring, the relationship between monitoring and control, and the efficacy of metacognitive control. The data suggest that monitoring may require few cognitive resources, but controlling one’s learning (e.g., planning what to restudy and implementing a plan) may demand significant mental resources. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.3758/s13423-021-01950-9. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-8205317 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2021 |
publisher | Springer US |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-82053172021-06-16 Dividing attention impairs metacognitive control more than monitoring Peng, Yaoping Tullis, Jonathan G. Psychon Bull Rev Brief Report Students consistently report multitasking (e.g., checking social media, texting, watching Netflix) when studying on their own (e.g., Junco & Cotton, Computers & Education, 59[2], 505–514, 2012). Multitasking impairs explicit learning (e.g., Carrier, Rosen, Cheever, & Lim, Developmental Review, 35, 64–78, 2015), but the impact of multitasking on metacognitive monitoring and control is less clear. Metacognition may compete with ongoing cognitive processing for mental resources (e.g., Nelson & Narens, The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 26, 125–141, 1990) and would be impaired by dividing attention; alternatively, metacognition may require little attention (e.g., Boekaerts & Niemivirta, Handbook of Self-Regulation [pp. 417–450], 2000) and would not be impacted by dividing attention. Across three experiments, we assessed the influence of divided attention on metacognition. Participants made item-by-item judgements of learning (JOLs) after studying word pairs under full or divided attention (Experiment 1) and made restudy choices (Experiments 2 & 3). Dividing attention had little impact on the resolution of learners’ metacognitive monitoring, but significantly impaired calibration of monitoring, the relationship between monitoring and control, and the efficacy of metacognitive control. The data suggest that monitoring may require few cognitive resources, but controlling one’s learning (e.g., planning what to restudy and implementing a plan) may demand significant mental resources. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.3758/s13423-021-01950-9. Springer US 2021-06-15 2021 /pmc/articles/PMC8205317/ /pubmed/34131889 http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13423-021-01950-9 Text en © The Psychonomic Society, Inc. 2021 This article is made available via the PMC Open Access Subset for unrestricted research re-use and secondary analysis in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for the duration of the World Health Organization (WHO) declaration of COVID-19 as a global pandemic. |
spellingShingle | Brief Report Peng, Yaoping Tullis, Jonathan G. Dividing attention impairs metacognitive control more than monitoring |
title | Dividing attention impairs metacognitive control more than monitoring |
title_full | Dividing attention impairs metacognitive control more than monitoring |
title_fullStr | Dividing attention impairs metacognitive control more than monitoring |
title_full_unstemmed | Dividing attention impairs metacognitive control more than monitoring |
title_short | Dividing attention impairs metacognitive control more than monitoring |
title_sort | dividing attention impairs metacognitive control more than monitoring |
topic | Brief Report |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8205317/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34131889 http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13423-021-01950-9 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT pengyaoping dividingattentionimpairsmetacognitivecontrolmorethanmonitoring AT tullisjonathang dividingattentionimpairsmetacognitivecontrolmorethanmonitoring |