Cargando…
Win-Stay-Lose-Shift as a self-confirming equilibrium in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
Evolutionary game theory assumes that players replicate a highly scored player’s strategy through genetic inheritance. However, when learning occurs culturally, it is often difficult to recognize someone’s strategy just by observing the behaviour. In this work, we consider players with memory-one st...
Autores principales: | Kim, Minjae, Choi, Jung-Kyoo, Baek, Seung Ki |
---|---|
Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
The Royal Society
2021
|
Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8242928/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34187189 http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2021.1021 |
Ejemplares similares
-
Win-Stay-Lose-Learn Promotes Cooperation in the Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma Game
por: Liu, Yongkui, et al.
Publicado: (2012) -
Win-stay-lose-learn promotes cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game with voluntary participation
por: Chu, Chen, et al.
Publicado: (2017) -
Dynamic aspiration based on Win-Stay-Lose-Learn rule in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game
por: Shi, Zhenyu, et al.
Publicado: (2021) -
Retention period differentially attenuates win–shift/lose–stay relative to win–stay/lose–shift performance in the rat
por: Reed, Phil
Publicado: (2017) -
A dynamic over games drives selfish agents to win–win outcomes
por: Frey, Seth, et al.
Publicado: (2020)