Divided by choice? For‐profit providers, patient choice and mechanisms of patient sorting in the English National Health Service

This paper studies patient choice of provider following government reforms in the 2000s, which allowed for‐profit surgical centers to compete with existing public National Health Service (NHS) hospitals in England. For‐profit providers offer significant benefits, notably shorter waiting times. We estimate the extent to which different types of patients benefit from the reforms, and we investigate mechanisms that cause differential benefits. Our counterfactual simulations show that, in terms of the value of access, entry of for‐profit providers benefitted the richest patients twice as much as the poorest, and white patients six times as much as ethnic minority patients. Half of these differences is explained by healthcare geography and patient health, while primary care referral practice plays a lesser, though non‐negligible role. We also show that, with capitated reimbursement, different compositions of patient risks between for‐profit surgical centers and existing public hospitals put public hospitals at a competitive disadvantage.