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State aid after the Banking Union: serious disturbance and public interest

An objective of the European Union’s Banking Union is to prevent Member States from having to subsidise banks. The Single Resolution Mechanism may have limited but has not eliminated state aid to banks. This is shown by the relevant statistics, the number of positive Commission decisions and the pro...

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Autor principal: Nicolaides, Phedon
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Palgrave Macmillan UK 2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8264990/
http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s41261-021-00173-1
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author Nicolaides, Phedon
author_facet Nicolaides, Phedon
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description An objective of the European Union’s Banking Union is to prevent Member States from having to subsidise banks. The Single Resolution Mechanism may have limited but has not eliminated state aid to banks. This is shown by the relevant statistics, the number of positive Commission decisions and the provisions of the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation. State aid is allowed in three situations: when a bank is resolved, when it is liquidated and when it is solvent but needs temporary liquidity or more capital. This article identifies a difference between the European Commission and the Single Resolution Board in the interpretation of the concept of “public interest”. The article further argues that this difference may not contradict the objectives of the Banking Union if state aid is still necessary to prevent damage to regional economies.
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spelling pubmed-82649902021-07-09 State aid after the Banking Union: serious disturbance and public interest Nicolaides, Phedon J Bank Regul Original Article An objective of the European Union’s Banking Union is to prevent Member States from having to subsidise banks. The Single Resolution Mechanism may have limited but has not eliminated state aid to banks. This is shown by the relevant statistics, the number of positive Commission decisions and the provisions of the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation. State aid is allowed in three situations: when a bank is resolved, when it is liquidated and when it is solvent but needs temporary liquidity or more capital. This article identifies a difference between the European Commission and the Single Resolution Board in the interpretation of the concept of “public interest”. The article further argues that this difference may not contradict the objectives of the Banking Union if state aid is still necessary to prevent damage to regional economies. Palgrave Macmillan UK 2021-07-08 2022 /pmc/articles/PMC8264990/ http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s41261-021-00173-1 Text en © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Limited 2021 This article is made available via the PMC Open Access Subset for unrestricted research re-use and secondary analysis in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for the duration of the World Health Organization (WHO) declaration of COVID-19 as a global pandemic.
spellingShingle Original Article
Nicolaides, Phedon
State aid after the Banking Union: serious disturbance and public interest
title State aid after the Banking Union: serious disturbance and public interest
title_full State aid after the Banking Union: serious disturbance and public interest
title_fullStr State aid after the Banking Union: serious disturbance and public interest
title_full_unstemmed State aid after the Banking Union: serious disturbance and public interest
title_short State aid after the Banking Union: serious disturbance and public interest
title_sort state aid after the banking union: serious disturbance and public interest
topic Original Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8264990/
http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s41261-021-00173-1
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