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Europe, public debts, and safe assets: the scope for a European Debt Agency
The Covid-19 crisis has radically changed the game for world and EU-economies, and urged for a reappraisal of the guidelines for a healthy management of public expenditure. This requires a deep rethinking of the role of public debt in modern capitalistic economies and of efficient, equitable and pol...
Autores principales: | , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Springer International Publishing
2021
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8286647/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35422591 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40888-021-00236-6 |
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author | Amato, Massimo Belloni, Everardo Falbo, Paolo Gobbi, Lucio |
author_facet | Amato, Massimo Belloni, Everardo Falbo, Paolo Gobbi, Lucio |
author_sort | Amato, Massimo |
collection | PubMed |
description | The Covid-19 crisis has radically changed the game for world and EU-economies, and urged for a reappraisal of the guidelines for a healthy management of public expenditure. This requires a deep rethinking of the role of public debt in modern capitalistic economies and of efficient, equitable and politically viable ways of financing it. This paper outlines the main operating framework of a Debt Agency tasked with the management of the Eurozone sovereign debts and the creation of a truly European safe asset. The framework leverages on the potential irredeemable nature of sovereign debts in order to build a common bond. By structurally filtering liquidity risk, the Debt Agency can price the Member States’ funding costs by referring only to their credit risk, as defined by EU agreed rules. The common bond issued by the Debt Agency thus avoids mutualisation by design; hence, it can be directly bought by the ECB. Due to its structural intertemporal sustainability, the Debt Agency’s framework delineated in this paper can serve as a benchmark for institutional and political decisions. In this perspective, a counterfactual exercise has been conducted in order to evaluate the future potential impact of the Debt Agency as well as the past distortions in market pricing of Member States’ fundamental risk due to market mispricing of the liquidity risk. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-8286647 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2021 |
publisher | Springer International Publishing |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-82866472021-07-19 Europe, public debts, and safe assets: the scope for a European Debt Agency Amato, Massimo Belloni, Everardo Falbo, Paolo Gobbi, Lucio Econ Polit (Bologna) Original Paper The Covid-19 crisis has radically changed the game for world and EU-economies, and urged for a reappraisal of the guidelines for a healthy management of public expenditure. This requires a deep rethinking of the role of public debt in modern capitalistic economies and of efficient, equitable and politically viable ways of financing it. This paper outlines the main operating framework of a Debt Agency tasked with the management of the Eurozone sovereign debts and the creation of a truly European safe asset. The framework leverages on the potential irredeemable nature of sovereign debts in order to build a common bond. By structurally filtering liquidity risk, the Debt Agency can price the Member States’ funding costs by referring only to their credit risk, as defined by EU agreed rules. The common bond issued by the Debt Agency thus avoids mutualisation by design; hence, it can be directly bought by the ECB. Due to its structural intertemporal sustainability, the Debt Agency’s framework delineated in this paper can serve as a benchmark for institutional and political decisions. In this perspective, a counterfactual exercise has been conducted in order to evaluate the future potential impact of the Debt Agency as well as the past distortions in market pricing of Member States’ fundamental risk due to market mispricing of the liquidity risk. Springer International Publishing 2021-07-18 2021 /pmc/articles/PMC8286647/ /pubmed/35422591 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40888-021-00236-6 Text en © The Author(s) 2021 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Open AccessThis article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) . |
spellingShingle | Original Paper Amato, Massimo Belloni, Everardo Falbo, Paolo Gobbi, Lucio Europe, public debts, and safe assets: the scope for a European Debt Agency |
title | Europe, public debts, and safe assets: the scope for a European Debt Agency |
title_full | Europe, public debts, and safe assets: the scope for a European Debt Agency |
title_fullStr | Europe, public debts, and safe assets: the scope for a European Debt Agency |
title_full_unstemmed | Europe, public debts, and safe assets: the scope for a European Debt Agency |
title_short | Europe, public debts, and safe assets: the scope for a European Debt Agency |
title_sort | europe, public debts, and safe assets: the scope for a european debt agency |
topic | Original Paper |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8286647/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35422591 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40888-021-00236-6 |
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