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A game theoretic power control and spectrum sharing approach using cost dominance in cognitive radio networks

The wireless networks face challenges in efficient utilization of bandwidth due to paucity of resources and lack of central management, which may result in undesired congestion. The cognitive radio (CR) paradigm can bring efficiency, better utilization of bandwidth, and appropriate management of lim...

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Autores principales: Naseer, Sundus, Minhas, Qurratul-Ain, Saleem, Khalid, Siddiqui, Ghazanfar Farooq, Bhatti, Naeem, Mahmood, Hasan
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: PeerJ Inc. 2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8293924/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34322591
http://dx.doi.org/10.7717/peerj-cs.617
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author Naseer, Sundus
Minhas, Qurratul-Ain
Saleem, Khalid
Siddiqui, Ghazanfar Farooq
Bhatti, Naeem
Mahmood, Hasan
author_facet Naseer, Sundus
Minhas, Qurratul-Ain
Saleem, Khalid
Siddiqui, Ghazanfar Farooq
Bhatti, Naeem
Mahmood, Hasan
author_sort Naseer, Sundus
collection PubMed
description The wireless networks face challenges in efficient utilization of bandwidth due to paucity of resources and lack of central management, which may result in undesired congestion. The cognitive radio (CR) paradigm can bring efficiency, better utilization of bandwidth, and appropriate management of limited resources. While the CR paradigm is an attractive choice, the CRs selfishly compete to acquire and utilize available bandwidth that may ultimately result in inappropriate power levels, causing degradation in network’s Quality of Service (QoS). A cooperative game theoretic approach can ease the problem of spectrum sharing and power utilization in a hostile and selfish environment. We focus on the challenge of congestion control that results in inadequate and uncontrolled access of channels and utilization of resources. The Nash equilibrium (NE) of a cooperative congestion game is examined by considering the cost basis, which is embedded in the utility function. The proposed algorithm inhibits the utility, which leads to the decrease in aggregate cost and global function maximization. The cost dominance is a pivotal agent for cooperation in CRs that results in efficient power allocation. Simulation results show reduction in power utilization due to improved management in cognitive radio resource allocation.
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spelling pubmed-82939242021-07-27 A game theoretic power control and spectrum sharing approach using cost dominance in cognitive radio networks Naseer, Sundus Minhas, Qurratul-Ain Saleem, Khalid Siddiqui, Ghazanfar Farooq Bhatti, Naeem Mahmood, Hasan PeerJ Comput Sci Artificial Intelligence The wireless networks face challenges in efficient utilization of bandwidth due to paucity of resources and lack of central management, which may result in undesired congestion. The cognitive radio (CR) paradigm can bring efficiency, better utilization of bandwidth, and appropriate management of limited resources. While the CR paradigm is an attractive choice, the CRs selfishly compete to acquire and utilize available bandwidth that may ultimately result in inappropriate power levels, causing degradation in network’s Quality of Service (QoS). A cooperative game theoretic approach can ease the problem of spectrum sharing and power utilization in a hostile and selfish environment. We focus on the challenge of congestion control that results in inadequate and uncontrolled access of channels and utilization of resources. The Nash equilibrium (NE) of a cooperative congestion game is examined by considering the cost basis, which is embedded in the utility function. The proposed algorithm inhibits the utility, which leads to the decrease in aggregate cost and global function maximization. The cost dominance is a pivotal agent for cooperation in CRs that results in efficient power allocation. Simulation results show reduction in power utilization due to improved management in cognitive radio resource allocation. PeerJ Inc. 2021-07-15 /pmc/articles/PMC8293924/ /pubmed/34322591 http://dx.doi.org/10.7717/peerj-cs.617 Text en © 2021 Naseer et al. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) , which permits unrestricted use, distribution, reproduction and adaptation in any medium and for any purpose provided that it is properly attributed. For attribution, the original author(s), title, publication source (PeerJ Computer Science) and either DOI or URL of the article must be cited.
spellingShingle Artificial Intelligence
Naseer, Sundus
Minhas, Qurratul-Ain
Saleem, Khalid
Siddiqui, Ghazanfar Farooq
Bhatti, Naeem
Mahmood, Hasan
A game theoretic power control and spectrum sharing approach using cost dominance in cognitive radio networks
title A game theoretic power control and spectrum sharing approach using cost dominance in cognitive radio networks
title_full A game theoretic power control and spectrum sharing approach using cost dominance in cognitive radio networks
title_fullStr A game theoretic power control and spectrum sharing approach using cost dominance in cognitive radio networks
title_full_unstemmed A game theoretic power control and spectrum sharing approach using cost dominance in cognitive radio networks
title_short A game theoretic power control and spectrum sharing approach using cost dominance in cognitive radio networks
title_sort game theoretic power control and spectrum sharing approach using cost dominance in cognitive radio networks
topic Artificial Intelligence
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8293924/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34322591
http://dx.doi.org/10.7717/peerj-cs.617
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