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Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Formal Sanctions
Economic theory suggests that the deterrence of deviant behavior is driven by a combination of severity and certainty of punishment. This paper presents the first controlled experiment to study a third important factor that has been mainly overlooked: the swiftness of formal sanctions. We consider t...
Autores principales: | , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Springer US
2021
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8298200/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34316094 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11166-021-09352-x |
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author | Buckenmaier, Johannes Dimant, Eugen Posten, Ann-Christin Schmidt, Ulrich |
author_facet | Buckenmaier, Johannes Dimant, Eugen Posten, Ann-Christin Schmidt, Ulrich |
author_sort | Buckenmaier, Johannes |
collection | PubMed |
description | Economic theory suggests that the deterrence of deviant behavior is driven by a combination of severity and certainty of punishment. This paper presents the first controlled experiment to study a third important factor that has been mainly overlooked: the swiftness of formal sanctions. We consider two dimensions: the timing at which the uncertainty about whether one will be punished is dissolved and the timing at which the punishment is actually imposed, as well as the combination thereof. By varying these dimensions of delay systematically, we find a surprising non-monotonic relation with deterrence: either no delay (immediate resolution and immediate punishment) or maximum delay (both resolution and punishment as much as possible delayed) emerge as most effective at deterring deviant behavior and recidivism. Our results yield implications for the design of institutional policies aimed at mitigating misconduct and reducing recidivism. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The online version contains supplementary material available at doi:10.1007/s11166-021-09352-x. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-8298200 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2021 |
publisher | Springer US |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-82982002021-07-23 Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Formal Sanctions Buckenmaier, Johannes Dimant, Eugen Posten, Ann-Christin Schmidt, Ulrich J Risk Uncertain Article Economic theory suggests that the deterrence of deviant behavior is driven by a combination of severity and certainty of punishment. This paper presents the first controlled experiment to study a third important factor that has been mainly overlooked: the swiftness of formal sanctions. We consider two dimensions: the timing at which the uncertainty about whether one will be punished is dissolved and the timing at which the punishment is actually imposed, as well as the combination thereof. By varying these dimensions of delay systematically, we find a surprising non-monotonic relation with deterrence: either no delay (immediate resolution and immediate punishment) or maximum delay (both resolution and punishment as much as possible delayed) emerge as most effective at deterring deviant behavior and recidivism. Our results yield implications for the design of institutional policies aimed at mitigating misconduct and reducing recidivism. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The online version contains supplementary material available at doi:10.1007/s11166-021-09352-x. Springer US 2021-07-23 2021 /pmc/articles/PMC8298200/ /pubmed/34316094 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11166-021-09352-x Text en © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2021 This article is made available via the PMC Open Access Subset for unrestricted research re-use and secondary analysis in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for the duration of the World Health Organization (WHO) declaration of COVID-19 as a global pandemic. |
spellingShingle | Article Buckenmaier, Johannes Dimant, Eugen Posten, Ann-Christin Schmidt, Ulrich Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Formal Sanctions |
title | Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Formal Sanctions |
title_full | Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Formal Sanctions |
title_fullStr | Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Formal Sanctions |
title_full_unstemmed | Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Formal Sanctions |
title_short | Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Formal Sanctions |
title_sort | efficient institutions and effective deterrence: on timing and uncertainty of formal sanctions |
topic | Article |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8298200/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34316094 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11166-021-09352-x |
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