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Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Formal Sanctions

Economic theory suggests that the deterrence of deviant behavior is driven by a combination of severity and certainty of punishment. This paper presents the first controlled experiment to study a third important factor that has been mainly overlooked: the swiftness of formal sanctions. We consider t...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Buckenmaier, Johannes, Dimant, Eugen, Posten, Ann-Christin, Schmidt, Ulrich
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Springer US 2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8298200/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34316094
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11166-021-09352-x
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author Buckenmaier, Johannes
Dimant, Eugen
Posten, Ann-Christin
Schmidt, Ulrich
author_facet Buckenmaier, Johannes
Dimant, Eugen
Posten, Ann-Christin
Schmidt, Ulrich
author_sort Buckenmaier, Johannes
collection PubMed
description Economic theory suggests that the deterrence of deviant behavior is driven by a combination of severity and certainty of punishment. This paper presents the first controlled experiment to study a third important factor that has been mainly overlooked: the swiftness of formal sanctions. We consider two dimensions: the timing at which the uncertainty about whether one will be punished is dissolved and the timing at which the punishment is actually imposed, as well as the combination thereof. By varying these dimensions of delay systematically, we find a surprising non-monotonic relation with deterrence: either no delay (immediate resolution and immediate punishment) or maximum delay (both resolution and punishment as much as possible delayed) emerge as most effective at deterring deviant behavior and recidivism. Our results yield implications for the design of institutional policies aimed at mitigating misconduct and reducing recidivism. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The online version contains supplementary material available at doi:10.1007/s11166-021-09352-x.
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spelling pubmed-82982002021-07-23 Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Formal Sanctions Buckenmaier, Johannes Dimant, Eugen Posten, Ann-Christin Schmidt, Ulrich J Risk Uncertain Article Economic theory suggests that the deterrence of deviant behavior is driven by a combination of severity and certainty of punishment. This paper presents the first controlled experiment to study a third important factor that has been mainly overlooked: the swiftness of formal sanctions. We consider two dimensions: the timing at which the uncertainty about whether one will be punished is dissolved and the timing at which the punishment is actually imposed, as well as the combination thereof. By varying these dimensions of delay systematically, we find a surprising non-monotonic relation with deterrence: either no delay (immediate resolution and immediate punishment) or maximum delay (both resolution and punishment as much as possible delayed) emerge as most effective at deterring deviant behavior and recidivism. Our results yield implications for the design of institutional policies aimed at mitigating misconduct and reducing recidivism. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The online version contains supplementary material available at doi:10.1007/s11166-021-09352-x. Springer US 2021-07-23 2021 /pmc/articles/PMC8298200/ /pubmed/34316094 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11166-021-09352-x Text en © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2021 This article is made available via the PMC Open Access Subset for unrestricted research re-use and secondary analysis in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for the duration of the World Health Organization (WHO) declaration of COVID-19 as a global pandemic.
spellingShingle Article
Buckenmaier, Johannes
Dimant, Eugen
Posten, Ann-Christin
Schmidt, Ulrich
Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Formal Sanctions
title Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Formal Sanctions
title_full Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Formal Sanctions
title_fullStr Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Formal Sanctions
title_full_unstemmed Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Formal Sanctions
title_short Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Formal Sanctions
title_sort efficient institutions and effective deterrence: on timing and uncertainty of formal sanctions
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8298200/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34316094
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11166-021-09352-x
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