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Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Formal Sanctions
Economic theory suggests that the deterrence of deviant behavior is driven by a combination of severity and certainty of punishment. This paper presents the first controlled experiment to study a third important factor that has been mainly overlooked: the swiftness of formal sanctions. We consider t...
Autores principales: | Buckenmaier, Johannes, Dimant, Eugen, Posten, Ann-Christin, Schmidt, Ulrich |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Springer US
2021
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8298200/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34316094 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11166-021-09352-x |
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