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Combination of institutional incentives for cooperative governance of risky commons
Finding appropriate incentives to enforce collaborative efforts for governing the commons in risky situations is a long-lasting challenge. Previous works have demonstrated that both punishing free-riders and rewarding cooperators could be potential tools to reach this goal. Despite weak theoretical...
Autores principales: | Sun, Weiwei, Liu, Linjie, Chen, Xiaojie, Szolnoki, Attila, Vasconcelos, Vítor V. |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Elsevier
2021
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8334382/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34381969 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2021.102844 |
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