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National central banks in EMU: time for revision?
The national central banks of the euro area are crucial to the monetary policy of the euro. Their Governors sit (on a personal title) on the Governing Council of the ECB, and they execute most of the monetary policies. Whereas the recent ruling by the German Constitutional Court on the Public Sector...
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
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Palgrave Macmillan UK
2021
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Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8355872/ http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s41261-021-00175-z |
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author | van der Sluis, Marijn |
author_facet | van der Sluis, Marijn |
author_sort | van der Sluis, Marijn |
collection | PubMed |
description | The national central banks of the euro area are crucial to the monetary policy of the euro. Their Governors sit (on a personal title) on the Governing Council of the ECB, and they execute most of the monetary policies. Whereas the recent ruling by the German Constitutional Court on the Public Sector Purchases Program highlighted the uncomfortable role of the German Bundesbank in between national and EU law, the euro-crisis already showed other legal strains on the position of the national central banks in Economic and Monetary Union. This article argues that EMU empowered national central banks, even when it took away their power to individually set monetary policies for their respective Member States. The euro-crisis then disturbed the balance struck in the construction of the ECB between protecting national interests and effective decision-making, resulting in several legal problems. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-8355872 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2021 |
publisher | Palgrave Macmillan UK |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-83558722021-08-11 National central banks in EMU: time for revision? van der Sluis, Marijn J Bank Regul Original Article The national central banks of the euro area are crucial to the monetary policy of the euro. Their Governors sit (on a personal title) on the Governing Council of the ECB, and they execute most of the monetary policies. Whereas the recent ruling by the German Constitutional Court on the Public Sector Purchases Program highlighted the uncomfortable role of the German Bundesbank in between national and EU law, the euro-crisis already showed other legal strains on the position of the national central banks in Economic and Monetary Union. This article argues that EMU empowered national central banks, even when it took away their power to individually set monetary policies for their respective Member States. The euro-crisis then disturbed the balance struck in the construction of the ECB between protecting national interests and effective decision-making, resulting in several legal problems. Palgrave Macmillan UK 2021-08-11 2022 /pmc/articles/PMC8355872/ http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s41261-021-00175-z Text en © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Limited 2021 This article is made available via the PMC Open Access Subset for unrestricted research re-use and secondary analysis in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for the duration of the World Health Organization (WHO) declaration of COVID-19 as a global pandemic. |
spellingShingle | Original Article van der Sluis, Marijn National central banks in EMU: time for revision? |
title | National central banks in EMU: time for revision? |
title_full | National central banks in EMU: time for revision? |
title_fullStr | National central banks in EMU: time for revision? |
title_full_unstemmed | National central banks in EMU: time for revision? |
title_short | National central banks in EMU: time for revision? |
title_sort | national central banks in emu: time for revision? |
topic | Original Article |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8355872/ http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s41261-021-00175-z |
work_keys_str_mv | AT vandersluismarijn nationalcentralbanksinemutimeforrevision |