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Human players manage to extort more than the mutual cooperation payoff in repeated social dilemmas
Social dilemmas are mixed-motive games. Although the players have a common interest in maintaining cooperation, each may try to obtain a larger payoff by cooperating less than the other. This phenomenon received increased attention after Press and Dyson discovered a class of strategies for the repea...
Autores principales: | D’Arcangelo, Chiara, Andreozzi, Luciano, Faillo, Marco |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Nature Publishing Group UK
2021
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8377025/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34413364 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-96061-9 |
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