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Protecting Physical Layer Secret Key Generation from Active Attacks
Lightweight session key agreement schemes are expected to play a central role in building Internet of things (IoT) security in sixth-generation (6G) networks. A well-established approach deriving from the physical layer is a secret key generation (SKG) from shared randomness (in the form of wireless...
Autores principales: | , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
MDPI
2021
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8394802/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34441100 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e23080960 |
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author | Mitev, Miroslav Chorti, Arsenia Belmega, E. Veronica Poor, H. Vincent |
author_facet | Mitev, Miroslav Chorti, Arsenia Belmega, E. Veronica Poor, H. Vincent |
author_sort | Mitev, Miroslav |
collection | PubMed |
description | Lightweight session key agreement schemes are expected to play a central role in building Internet of things (IoT) security in sixth-generation (6G) networks. A well-established approach deriving from the physical layer is a secret key generation (SKG) from shared randomness (in the form of wireless fading coefficients). However, although practical, SKG schemes have been shown to be vulnerable to active attacks over the initial “advantage distillation” phase, throughout which estimates of the fading coefficients are obtained at the legitimate users. In fact, by injecting carefully designed signals during this phase, a man-in-the-middle (MiM) attack could manipulate and control part of the reconciled bits and thus render SKG vulnerable to brute force attacks. Alternatively, a denial of service attack can be mounted by a reactive jammer. In this paper, we investigate the impact of injection and jamming attacks during the advantage distillation in a multiple-input–multiple-output (MIMO) system. First, we show that a MiM attack can be mounted as long as the attacker has one extra antenna with respect to the legitimate users, and we propose a pilot randomization scheme that allows the legitimate users to successfully reduce the injection attack to a less harmful jamming attack. Secondly, by taking a game-theoretic approach we evaluate the optimal strategies available to the legitimate users in the presence of reactive jammers. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-8394802 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2021 |
publisher | MDPI |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-83948022021-08-28 Protecting Physical Layer Secret Key Generation from Active Attacks Mitev, Miroslav Chorti, Arsenia Belmega, E. Veronica Poor, H. Vincent Entropy (Basel) Article Lightweight session key agreement schemes are expected to play a central role in building Internet of things (IoT) security in sixth-generation (6G) networks. A well-established approach deriving from the physical layer is a secret key generation (SKG) from shared randomness (in the form of wireless fading coefficients). However, although practical, SKG schemes have been shown to be vulnerable to active attacks over the initial “advantage distillation” phase, throughout which estimates of the fading coefficients are obtained at the legitimate users. In fact, by injecting carefully designed signals during this phase, a man-in-the-middle (MiM) attack could manipulate and control part of the reconciled bits and thus render SKG vulnerable to brute force attacks. Alternatively, a denial of service attack can be mounted by a reactive jammer. In this paper, we investigate the impact of injection and jamming attacks during the advantage distillation in a multiple-input–multiple-output (MIMO) system. First, we show that a MiM attack can be mounted as long as the attacker has one extra antenna with respect to the legitimate users, and we propose a pilot randomization scheme that allows the legitimate users to successfully reduce the injection attack to a less harmful jamming attack. Secondly, by taking a game-theoretic approach we evaluate the optimal strategies available to the legitimate users in the presence of reactive jammers. MDPI 2021-07-27 /pmc/articles/PMC8394802/ /pubmed/34441100 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e23080960 Text en © 2021 by the authors. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). |
spellingShingle | Article Mitev, Miroslav Chorti, Arsenia Belmega, E. Veronica Poor, H. Vincent Protecting Physical Layer Secret Key Generation from Active Attacks |
title | Protecting Physical Layer Secret Key Generation from Active Attacks |
title_full | Protecting Physical Layer Secret Key Generation from Active Attacks |
title_fullStr | Protecting Physical Layer Secret Key Generation from Active Attacks |
title_full_unstemmed | Protecting Physical Layer Secret Key Generation from Active Attacks |
title_short | Protecting Physical Layer Secret Key Generation from Active Attacks |
title_sort | protecting physical layer secret key generation from active attacks |
topic | Article |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8394802/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34441100 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e23080960 |
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