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Retributivism and Over-Punishment

Lately it has become a commonplace to complain about the injustice of mass incarceration. I share the sentiment that this phenomenon has been an injustice. But it also has become orthodoxy to allege that the acceptance of a retributive penal philosophy has been one of the chief factors that has brou...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Husak, Douglas
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Springer Netherlands 2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8417646/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34511672
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10982-021-09422-w
Descripción
Sumario:Lately it has become a commonplace to complain about the injustice of mass incarceration. I share the sentiment that this phenomenon has been an injustice. But it also has become orthodoxy to allege that the acceptance of a retributive penal philosophy has been one of the chief factors that has brought about mass incarceration in the first place. As a self-proclaimed retributivist, I find these allegations to be troubling and unwarranted. The point of this paper is to take steps to rebut them. I begin by making four conceptual points about retributivism. If I am correct, retributivism comes in countless flavors, and the particular variety to which I am most attracted can be applied to show why some punishments should be less severe than those presently imposed. Next I argue that many persons deserve less punishment than our legal system currently inflicts. Reflection about whether perpetrators should be afforded a complete or partial defense reveals retributivism to be less punitive than conventional wisdom would suggest.