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Barbarigenesis and the collapse of complex societies: Rome and after
“Barbarism” is perhaps best understood as a recurring syndrome among peripheral societies in response to the threats and opportunities presented by more developed neighbors. This article develops a mathematical model of barbarigenesis—the formation of “barbarian” societies adjacent to more complex s...
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
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Public Library of Science
2021
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Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8445445/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34529697 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0254240 |
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author | Jones, Doug |
author_facet | Jones, Doug |
author_sort | Jones, Doug |
collection | PubMed |
description | “Barbarism” is perhaps best understood as a recurring syndrome among peripheral societies in response to the threats and opportunities presented by more developed neighbors. This article develops a mathematical model of barbarigenesis—the formation of “barbarian” societies adjacent to more complex societies—and its consequences, and applies the model to the case of Europe in the first millennium CE. A starting point is a game (developed by Hirshleifer) in which two players allocate their resources either to producing wealth or to fighting over wealth. The paradoxical result is that a richer and potentially more powerful player may lose out to a poorer player, because the opportunity cost of fighting is greater for the former. In a more elaborate spatial model with many players, the outcome is a wealth-power mismatch: central regions have comparatively more wealth than power, peripheral regions have comparatively more power than wealth. In a model of historical dynamics, a wealth-power mismatch generates a long-lasting decline in social complexity, sweeping from more to less developed regions, until wealth and power come to be more closely aligned. This article reviews how well this model fits the historical record of late Antiquity and the early Middle Ages in Europe both quantitatively and qualitatively. The article also considers some of the history left out of the model, and why the model doesn’t apply to the modern world. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-8445445 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2021 |
publisher | Public Library of Science |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-84454452021-09-17 Barbarigenesis and the collapse of complex societies: Rome and after Jones, Doug PLoS One Research Article “Barbarism” is perhaps best understood as a recurring syndrome among peripheral societies in response to the threats and opportunities presented by more developed neighbors. This article develops a mathematical model of barbarigenesis—the formation of “barbarian” societies adjacent to more complex societies—and its consequences, and applies the model to the case of Europe in the first millennium CE. A starting point is a game (developed by Hirshleifer) in which two players allocate their resources either to producing wealth or to fighting over wealth. The paradoxical result is that a richer and potentially more powerful player may lose out to a poorer player, because the opportunity cost of fighting is greater for the former. In a more elaborate spatial model with many players, the outcome is a wealth-power mismatch: central regions have comparatively more wealth than power, peripheral regions have comparatively more power than wealth. In a model of historical dynamics, a wealth-power mismatch generates a long-lasting decline in social complexity, sweeping from more to less developed regions, until wealth and power come to be more closely aligned. This article reviews how well this model fits the historical record of late Antiquity and the early Middle Ages in Europe both quantitatively and qualitatively. The article also considers some of the history left out of the model, and why the model doesn’t apply to the modern world. Public Library of Science 2021-09-16 /pmc/articles/PMC8445445/ /pubmed/34529697 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0254240 Text en © 2021 Doug Jones https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) , which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. |
spellingShingle | Research Article Jones, Doug Barbarigenesis and the collapse of complex societies: Rome and after |
title | Barbarigenesis and the collapse of complex societies: Rome and after |
title_full | Barbarigenesis and the collapse of complex societies: Rome and after |
title_fullStr | Barbarigenesis and the collapse of complex societies: Rome and after |
title_full_unstemmed | Barbarigenesis and the collapse of complex societies: Rome and after |
title_short | Barbarigenesis and the collapse of complex societies: Rome and after |
title_sort | barbarigenesis and the collapse of complex societies: rome and after |
topic | Research Article |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8445445/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34529697 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0254240 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT jonesdoug barbarigenesisandthecollapseofcomplexsocietiesromeandafter |