Cargando…
Cooperating to show that you care: costly helping as an honest signal of fitness interdependence
Social organisms often need to know how much to trust others to cooperate. Organisms can expect cooperation from another organism that depends on them (i.e. stake or fitness interdependence), but how do individuals assess fitness interdependence? Here, we extend fitness interdependence into a signal...
Autores principales: | Barclay, Pat, Bliege Bird, Rebecca, Roberts, Gilbert, Számadó, Szabolcs |
---|---|
Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
The Royal Society
2021
|
Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8487747/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34601912 http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2020.0292 |
Ejemplares similares
-
One problem, too many solutions: How costly is honest signalling of need?
por: Számadó, Szabolcs, et al.
Publicado: (2019) -
Condition-dependent trade-offs maintain honest signalling
por: Számadó, Szabolcs, et al.
Publicado: (2022) -
Honesty and dishonesty in gossip strategies: a fitness interdependence analysis
por: Wu, Junhui, et al.
Publicado: (2021) -
When honesty and cheating pay off: the evolution of honest and dishonest equilibria in a conventional signalling game
por: Számadó, Szabolcs
Publicado: (2017) -
Juvenile honest food solicitation and parental investment as a life history strategy: A kin demographic selection model
por: Garay, József, et al.
Publicado: (2018)