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The Illusion of the China-US-Europe Strategic Triangle: Reactions from Germany and the UK
The dawn of the Sino-US peer competition has broken, denoting a new status quo of instability as Beijing and Washington vie for influence. As leader of the rules-based international order (RIO), Washington under the Trump administration nevertheless adopted an “America first” posture, which triggere...
Autores principales: | , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Springer Netherlands
2021
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8527975/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34697527 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11366-021-09771-2 |
Sumario: | The dawn of the Sino-US peer competition has broken, denoting a new status quo of instability as Beijing and Washington vie for influence. As leader of the rules-based international order (RIO), Washington under the Trump administration nevertheless adopted an “America first” posture, which triggered a transatlantic discord. Simultaneously, Beijing, having signalled discontent with existing settlements, has sought to alter international arrangements to cement its leadership role. Europe has been identified as a significant theatre for the emerging competition, with Germany and the UK recognized as essential target states for Beijing’s efforts, yet are simultaneously major stakeholders in the US-led RIO. As such, this article sets out to operationalize a European narrative of hedging. The article poses the questions, how does the transatlantic discord and Beijing’s leadership ambitions impact the hedging strategies of Germany and the UK, and why do such coping behaviors differ in various indices? Utilizing key signals from policy practitioners, policy elites’ rhetoric and national strategies, it is contended that while the UK is struggling to formulate a coherent foreign policy and now finds itself aligned with US foreign policy narratives, Germany is unlikely to signal its wishes to become strategically independent, if the US and EU foreign policy imperatives accord with Berlin’s political and economic interests. These two case studies reveal that both European powers are decidedly wary about Beijing’s signals and intentions, and are likely to retain closer alignment with Washington, foregoing strategic independence and illustrating the temporary nature of the transatlantic discord. Both will not, however, wish to relinquish Beijing, so long as attractive economic benefits can be attained, resulting in an inexplicit strategic hedge. |
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