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Expectations of objective threats and aversive feelings in specific fears
Mistaken beliefs about danger posed by feared stimuli are considered a key factor causing and maintaining fears. Such beliefs are intriguing because many fearful people express them, but acknowledge they are untrue in reality. While previous research indicates fearful individuals may not wholly endo...
Autores principales: | , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Nature Publishing Group UK
2021
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8531133/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34675285 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-00317-3 |
Sumario: | Mistaken beliefs about danger posed by feared stimuli are considered a key factor causing and maintaining fears. Such beliefs are intriguing because many fearful people express them, but acknowledge they are untrue in reality. While previous research indicates fearful individuals may not wholly endorse their beliefs about objective threats (e.g., the spider will bite), expectations of negative subjective consequences (e.g., I will feel terrible) are also likely to be important. We investigated the extent to which participants’ expectations of objective and subjective threats were sensitive to manipulations that encouraged them to consider whether their expectations were likely to happen in reality. Across five online experiments (N = 560, or 727 with more liberal inclusion criteria), such manipulations produced lower expectancy ratings for objective but not subjective threats (versus participants who gave ratings without the manipulation). Most participants reported that anticipation of negative feelings was more concerning than actual danger. Hence, numerous fear-relevant expectations about objective threat—considered central in understanding why people are irrationally afraid—respond to small cognitive manipulations. Additionally, expectations of negative subjective experiences during fear-provoking encounters appear to be more consistently endorsed, and feature prominently in fearful individuals’ concerns about what will happen in a fear-relevant situation. |
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