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COVID-19 in Slovenia, from a Success Story to Disaster: What Lessons Can Be Learned?

During the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in spring 2020, Slovenia was among the least affected countries, but the situation became drastically worse during the second wave in autumn 2020 with high numbers of deaths per number of inhabitants, ranking Slovenia among the most affected countries....

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Autores principales: Ružić Gorenjec, Nina, Kejžar, Nataša, Manevski, Damjan, Pohar Perme, Maja, Vratanar, Bor, Blagus, Rok
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: MDPI 2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8541564/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34685416
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/life11101045
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author Ružić Gorenjec, Nina
Kejžar, Nataša
Manevski, Damjan
Pohar Perme, Maja
Vratanar, Bor
Blagus, Rok
author_facet Ružić Gorenjec, Nina
Kejžar, Nataša
Manevski, Damjan
Pohar Perme, Maja
Vratanar, Bor
Blagus, Rok
author_sort Ružić Gorenjec, Nina
collection PubMed
description During the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in spring 2020, Slovenia was among the least affected countries, but the situation became drastically worse during the second wave in autumn 2020 with high numbers of deaths per number of inhabitants, ranking Slovenia among the most affected countries. This was true even though strict non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to control the progression of the epidemic were being enforced. Using a semi-parametric Bayesian model developed for the purpose of this study, we explore if and how the changes in mobility, their timing and the activation of contact tracing can explain the differences in the epidemic progression of the two waves. To fit the model, we use data on daily numbers of deaths, patients in hospitals, intensive care units, etc., and allow transmission intensity to be affected by contact tracing and mobility (data obtained from Google Mobility Reports). Our results imply that though there is some heterogeneity not explained by mobility levels and contact tracing, implementing interventions at a similar stage as in the first wave would keep the death toll and the health system burden low in the second wave as well. On the other hand, sticking to the same timeline of interventions as observed in the second wave and focusing on enforcing a higher decrease in mobility would not be as beneficial. According to our model, the ‘dance’ strategy, i.e., first allowing the numbers to rise and then implementing strict interventions to make them drop again, has been played at too-late stages of the epidemic. In contrast, a 15–20% reduction of mobility compared to pre-COVID level, if started at the beginning and maintained for the entire duration of the second wave and coupled with contact tracing, could suffice to control the epidemic. A very important factor in this result is the presence of contact tracing; without it, the reduction in mobility needs to be substantially larger. The flexibility of our proposed model allows similar analyses to be conducted for other regions even with slightly different data sources for the progression of the epidemic; the extension to more than two waves is straightforward. The model could help policymakers worldwide to make better decisions in terms of the timing and severity of the adopted NPIs.
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spelling pubmed-85415642021-10-24 COVID-19 in Slovenia, from a Success Story to Disaster: What Lessons Can Be Learned? Ružić Gorenjec, Nina Kejžar, Nataša Manevski, Damjan Pohar Perme, Maja Vratanar, Bor Blagus, Rok Life (Basel) Article During the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in spring 2020, Slovenia was among the least affected countries, but the situation became drastically worse during the second wave in autumn 2020 with high numbers of deaths per number of inhabitants, ranking Slovenia among the most affected countries. This was true even though strict non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to control the progression of the epidemic were being enforced. Using a semi-parametric Bayesian model developed for the purpose of this study, we explore if and how the changes in mobility, their timing and the activation of contact tracing can explain the differences in the epidemic progression of the two waves. To fit the model, we use data on daily numbers of deaths, patients in hospitals, intensive care units, etc., and allow transmission intensity to be affected by contact tracing and mobility (data obtained from Google Mobility Reports). Our results imply that though there is some heterogeneity not explained by mobility levels and contact tracing, implementing interventions at a similar stage as in the first wave would keep the death toll and the health system burden low in the second wave as well. On the other hand, sticking to the same timeline of interventions as observed in the second wave and focusing on enforcing a higher decrease in mobility would not be as beneficial. According to our model, the ‘dance’ strategy, i.e., first allowing the numbers to rise and then implementing strict interventions to make them drop again, has been played at too-late stages of the epidemic. In contrast, a 15–20% reduction of mobility compared to pre-COVID level, if started at the beginning and maintained for the entire duration of the second wave and coupled with contact tracing, could suffice to control the epidemic. A very important factor in this result is the presence of contact tracing; without it, the reduction in mobility needs to be substantially larger. The flexibility of our proposed model allows similar analyses to be conducted for other regions even with slightly different data sources for the progression of the epidemic; the extension to more than two waves is straightforward. The model could help policymakers worldwide to make better decisions in terms of the timing and severity of the adopted NPIs. MDPI 2021-10-04 /pmc/articles/PMC8541564/ /pubmed/34685416 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/life11101045 Text en © 2021 by the authors. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
spellingShingle Article
Ružić Gorenjec, Nina
Kejžar, Nataša
Manevski, Damjan
Pohar Perme, Maja
Vratanar, Bor
Blagus, Rok
COVID-19 in Slovenia, from a Success Story to Disaster: What Lessons Can Be Learned?
title COVID-19 in Slovenia, from a Success Story to Disaster: What Lessons Can Be Learned?
title_full COVID-19 in Slovenia, from a Success Story to Disaster: What Lessons Can Be Learned?
title_fullStr COVID-19 in Slovenia, from a Success Story to Disaster: What Lessons Can Be Learned?
title_full_unstemmed COVID-19 in Slovenia, from a Success Story to Disaster: What Lessons Can Be Learned?
title_short COVID-19 in Slovenia, from a Success Story to Disaster: What Lessons Can Be Learned?
title_sort covid-19 in slovenia, from a success story to disaster: what lessons can be learned?
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8541564/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34685416
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/life11101045
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