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Prospect patents and CRISPR; rivalry and ethical licensing in a semi-commons environment

The prospect theory of patents views patents as a tool for the development and commercialization of inventions. Prospect patents rely on broad control of technology so that rivalry between competing products is diminished thus avoiding waste of common-pool resources. The theory has been widely criti...

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Autores principales: Panagopoulos, Andreas, Sideri, Katerina
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Oxford University Press 2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8545401/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34707879
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsab031
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author Panagopoulos, Andreas
Sideri, Katerina
author_facet Panagopoulos, Andreas
Sideri, Katerina
author_sort Panagopoulos, Andreas
collection PubMed
description The prospect theory of patents views patents as a tool for the development and commercialization of inventions. Prospect patents rely on broad control of technology so that rivalry between competing products is diminished thus avoiding waste of common-pool resources. The theory has been widely criticized but in this article we argue that it does not address the realities of an economy where many innovations are created by universities. Although university patents on inventions such as new gene-editing tools fit squarely in the definition of prospect patents, they may still allow rivalry to resurface at the commercialization stage. This rivalry is not between competing firms; it is between competing visions of the prospect: ‘the university’s vision versus the licensees.’ We use as a case study the CRISPR-Cas9 technology invented by universities and commercialized by licensees. We employ patent landscape analysis showing that CRISPR-Cas9’s prospects comply with the characteristics of prospect patents and, above all, diminish rivalry at the commercialization stage. As the lack of competition leads to excessive treatment prices, tensions arise because the licensee understands CRISPR-Cas9 as a revenue-generating prospect, whereas the university views it as a technology requiring broad distribution. Such discerning visions can breed rivalry between licensor and licensee despite broad patent rights. In addressing this we turn to the literature on semi-commons, which implies an environment where private rights of exclusion such as prospect patents work with ethical licenses and a domain of resources open for reuse to foster innovation. We argue that in this environment, universities can emerge as important actors in the regulatory enterprise through additional ex post licensing. To this end, we propose a market-based solution in the form of a license allowing for patent re-licensing if the licensee fails to address a predefined demand for the final product.
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spelling pubmed-85454012021-10-26 Prospect patents and CRISPR; rivalry and ethical licensing in a semi-commons environment Panagopoulos, Andreas Sideri, Katerina J Law Biosci Original Article The prospect theory of patents views patents as a tool for the development and commercialization of inventions. Prospect patents rely on broad control of technology so that rivalry between competing products is diminished thus avoiding waste of common-pool resources. The theory has been widely criticized but in this article we argue that it does not address the realities of an economy where many innovations are created by universities. Although university patents on inventions such as new gene-editing tools fit squarely in the definition of prospect patents, they may still allow rivalry to resurface at the commercialization stage. This rivalry is not between competing firms; it is between competing visions of the prospect: ‘the university’s vision versus the licensees.’ We use as a case study the CRISPR-Cas9 technology invented by universities and commercialized by licensees. We employ patent landscape analysis showing that CRISPR-Cas9’s prospects comply with the characteristics of prospect patents and, above all, diminish rivalry at the commercialization stage. As the lack of competition leads to excessive treatment prices, tensions arise because the licensee understands CRISPR-Cas9 as a revenue-generating prospect, whereas the university views it as a technology requiring broad distribution. Such discerning visions can breed rivalry between licensor and licensee despite broad patent rights. In addressing this we turn to the literature on semi-commons, which implies an environment where private rights of exclusion such as prospect patents work with ethical licenses and a domain of resources open for reuse to foster innovation. We argue that in this environment, universities can emerge as important actors in the regulatory enterprise through additional ex post licensing. To this end, we propose a market-based solution in the form of a license allowing for patent re-licensing if the licensee fails to address a predefined demand for the final product. Oxford University Press 2021-10-24 /pmc/articles/PMC8545401/ /pubmed/34707879 http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsab031 Text en © The Author(s) 2021. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Duke University School of Law, Harvard Law School, Oxford University Press, and Stanford Law School. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact journals.permissions@oup.com
spellingShingle Original Article
Panagopoulos, Andreas
Sideri, Katerina
Prospect patents and CRISPR; rivalry and ethical licensing in a semi-commons environment
title Prospect patents and CRISPR; rivalry and ethical licensing in a semi-commons environment
title_full Prospect patents and CRISPR; rivalry and ethical licensing in a semi-commons environment
title_fullStr Prospect patents and CRISPR; rivalry and ethical licensing in a semi-commons environment
title_full_unstemmed Prospect patents and CRISPR; rivalry and ethical licensing in a semi-commons environment
title_short Prospect patents and CRISPR; rivalry and ethical licensing in a semi-commons environment
title_sort prospect patents and crispr; rivalry and ethical licensing in a semi-commons environment
topic Original Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8545401/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34707879
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsab031
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