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How to Reach a Regional Cooperation Mechanism to Deal With the Epidemic: An Analysis From the Game Theory Perspective
The outbreak and persistence of COVID-19 have posed a great threat to global public health and economic development. The continuous economic deterioration has been intensified due to the continuous prevention and control measures, such as closed management. Insisting on the prevention of the epidemi...
Autores principales: | , , , , , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Frontiers Media S.A.
2021
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8551577/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34722447 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2021.738184 |
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author | Yang, Hualei Wu, Yuanyang Yao, Yidan Zhang, Siqing Zhang, Shuo Xie, Lin Li, Zhiyun Tang, Lili |
author_facet | Yang, Hualei Wu, Yuanyang Yao, Yidan Zhang, Siqing Zhang, Shuo Xie, Lin Li, Zhiyun Tang, Lili |
author_sort | Yang, Hualei |
collection | PubMed |
description | The outbreak and persistence of COVID-19 have posed a great threat to global public health and economic development. The continuous economic deterioration has been intensified due to the continuous prevention and control measures, such as closed management. Insisting on the prevention of the epidemic or economic restart has become a dilemma for all countries. Epidemic prevention is not only the main behavior of a single country but also a common problem faced by all countries in the region. Continuous prevention measures will affect economic development, but an early restart of the economy is faced with the recurrence of the epidemic. To avoid the emergence of prisoner's dilemma in the governance of the epidemic, each country cannot make decisions with its optimization, and so it is necessary to build a regional cooperation mechanism to achieve the overall optimization of the economy and prevent the epidemic. Based on the game theory, we analyzed the behavior of countries when carrying out regional cooperation to govern the epidemic and put forward specific cooperative income distribution schemes according to the different attributes of the countries. Our results showed that in the presence of population mobility, regional cooperation to govern the epidemic can minimize the total number of infected people and maximize the overall utility of the region, which was significantly better than the overall benefits of the region in the case of non-cooperation. However, in detail, the smaller the difference of preference for preventing and controlling the epidemic between the two, the more likely it is to lead to a win-win situation. Otherwise, there will be one with damaged interests. When damaged interests appear, the appropriate distribution of cooperative income to the country with a small economic scale and low preference in preventing the epidemic is more conducive to the achievement of cooperative mechanisms and the realization of a win-win situation in the region. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-8551577 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2021 |
publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-85515772021-10-29 How to Reach a Regional Cooperation Mechanism to Deal With the Epidemic: An Analysis From the Game Theory Perspective Yang, Hualei Wu, Yuanyang Yao, Yidan Zhang, Siqing Zhang, Shuo Xie, Lin Li, Zhiyun Tang, Lili Front Public Health Public Health The outbreak and persistence of COVID-19 have posed a great threat to global public health and economic development. The continuous economic deterioration has been intensified due to the continuous prevention and control measures, such as closed management. Insisting on the prevention of the epidemic or economic restart has become a dilemma for all countries. Epidemic prevention is not only the main behavior of a single country but also a common problem faced by all countries in the region. Continuous prevention measures will affect economic development, but an early restart of the economy is faced with the recurrence of the epidemic. To avoid the emergence of prisoner's dilemma in the governance of the epidemic, each country cannot make decisions with its optimization, and so it is necessary to build a regional cooperation mechanism to achieve the overall optimization of the economy and prevent the epidemic. Based on the game theory, we analyzed the behavior of countries when carrying out regional cooperation to govern the epidemic and put forward specific cooperative income distribution schemes according to the different attributes of the countries. Our results showed that in the presence of population mobility, regional cooperation to govern the epidemic can minimize the total number of infected people and maximize the overall utility of the region, which was significantly better than the overall benefits of the region in the case of non-cooperation. However, in detail, the smaller the difference of preference for preventing and controlling the epidemic between the two, the more likely it is to lead to a win-win situation. Otherwise, there will be one with damaged interests. When damaged interests appear, the appropriate distribution of cooperative income to the country with a small economic scale and low preference in preventing the epidemic is more conducive to the achievement of cooperative mechanisms and the realization of a win-win situation in the region. Frontiers Media S.A. 2021-10-14 /pmc/articles/PMC8551577/ /pubmed/34722447 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2021.738184 Text en Copyright © 2021 Yang, Wu, Yao, Zhang, Zhang, Xie, Li and Tang. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms. |
spellingShingle | Public Health Yang, Hualei Wu, Yuanyang Yao, Yidan Zhang, Siqing Zhang, Shuo Xie, Lin Li, Zhiyun Tang, Lili How to Reach a Regional Cooperation Mechanism to Deal With the Epidemic: An Analysis From the Game Theory Perspective |
title | How to Reach a Regional Cooperation Mechanism to Deal With the Epidemic: An Analysis From the Game Theory Perspective |
title_full | How to Reach a Regional Cooperation Mechanism to Deal With the Epidemic: An Analysis From the Game Theory Perspective |
title_fullStr | How to Reach a Regional Cooperation Mechanism to Deal With the Epidemic: An Analysis From the Game Theory Perspective |
title_full_unstemmed | How to Reach a Regional Cooperation Mechanism to Deal With the Epidemic: An Analysis From the Game Theory Perspective |
title_short | How to Reach a Regional Cooperation Mechanism to Deal With the Epidemic: An Analysis From the Game Theory Perspective |
title_sort | how to reach a regional cooperation mechanism to deal with the epidemic: an analysis from the game theory perspective |
topic | Public Health |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8551577/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34722447 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2021.738184 |
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