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Bounded rational response equilibria in human sensorimotor interactions

The Nash equilibrium is one of the most central solution concepts to study strategic interactions between multiple players and has recently also been shown to capture sensorimotor interactions between players that are haptically coupled. While previous studies in behavioural economics have shown tha...

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Autores principales: Lindig-León, Cecilia, Schmid, Gerrit, Braun, Daniel A.
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: The Royal Society 2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8564607/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34727714
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2021.2094
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author Lindig-León, Cecilia
Schmid, Gerrit
Braun, Daniel A.
author_facet Lindig-León, Cecilia
Schmid, Gerrit
Braun, Daniel A.
author_sort Lindig-León, Cecilia
collection PubMed
description The Nash equilibrium is one of the most central solution concepts to study strategic interactions between multiple players and has recently also been shown to capture sensorimotor interactions between players that are haptically coupled. While previous studies in behavioural economics have shown that systematic deviations from Nash equilibria in economic decision-making can be explained by the more general quantal response equilibria, such deviations have not been reported for the sensorimotor domain. Here we investigate haptically coupled dyads across three different sensorimotor games corresponding to the classic symmetric and asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma, where the quantal response equilibrium predicts characteristic shifts across the three games, although the Nash equilibrium stays the same. We find that subjects exhibit the predicted deviations from the Nash solution. Furthermore, we show that taking into account subjects' priors for the games, we arrive at a more accurate description of bounded rational response equilibria that can be regarded as a quantal response equilibrium with non-uniform prior. Our results suggest that bounded rational response equilibria provide a general tool to explain sensorimotor interactions that include the Nash equilibrium as a special case in the absence of information processing limitations.
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spelling pubmed-85646072021-11-20 Bounded rational response equilibria in human sensorimotor interactions Lindig-León, Cecilia Schmid, Gerrit Braun, Daniel A. Proc Biol Sci Behaviour The Nash equilibrium is one of the most central solution concepts to study strategic interactions between multiple players and has recently also been shown to capture sensorimotor interactions between players that are haptically coupled. While previous studies in behavioural economics have shown that systematic deviations from Nash equilibria in economic decision-making can be explained by the more general quantal response equilibria, such deviations have not been reported for the sensorimotor domain. Here we investigate haptically coupled dyads across three different sensorimotor games corresponding to the classic symmetric and asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma, where the quantal response equilibrium predicts characteristic shifts across the three games, although the Nash equilibrium stays the same. We find that subjects exhibit the predicted deviations from the Nash solution. Furthermore, we show that taking into account subjects' priors for the games, we arrive at a more accurate description of bounded rational response equilibria that can be regarded as a quantal response equilibrium with non-uniform prior. Our results suggest that bounded rational response equilibria provide a general tool to explain sensorimotor interactions that include the Nash equilibrium as a special case in the absence of information processing limitations. The Royal Society 2021-11-10 2021-11-03 /pmc/articles/PMC8564607/ /pubmed/34727714 http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2021.2094 Text en © 2021 The Authors. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) , which permits unrestricted use, provided the original author and source are credited.
spellingShingle Behaviour
Lindig-León, Cecilia
Schmid, Gerrit
Braun, Daniel A.
Bounded rational response equilibria in human sensorimotor interactions
title Bounded rational response equilibria in human sensorimotor interactions
title_full Bounded rational response equilibria in human sensorimotor interactions
title_fullStr Bounded rational response equilibria in human sensorimotor interactions
title_full_unstemmed Bounded rational response equilibria in human sensorimotor interactions
title_short Bounded rational response equilibria in human sensorimotor interactions
title_sort bounded rational response equilibria in human sensorimotor interactions
topic Behaviour
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8564607/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34727714
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2021.2094
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