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Robot Responsibility and Moral Community
It is almost a foregone conclusion that robots cannot be morally responsible agents, both because they lack traditional features of moral agency like consciousness, intentionality, or empathy and because of the apparent senselessness of holding them accountable. Moreover, although some theorists inc...
Autor principal: | Gogoshin, Dane Leigh |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Frontiers Media S.A.
2021
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8646153/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34881294 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/frobt.2021.768092 |
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