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Influence Mechanism on Supplier Emission Reduction Based on a Two-Level Supply Chain
The purpose of this paper is to investigate environmental performance of a supply chain which consists of an upstream supplier and a downstream firm. A mathematical model considering both downstream firm’s monitoring and governmental intervention is developed. Afterwards, a numerical example is pres...
Autores principales: | , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
MDPI
2021
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8656572/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34886165 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph182312439 |
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author | Ma, Lina Zhang, Xinran Du, Yushen |
author_facet | Ma, Lina Zhang, Xinran Du, Yushen |
author_sort | Ma, Lina |
collection | PubMed |
description | The purpose of this paper is to investigate environmental performance of a supply chain which consists of an upstream supplier and a downstream firm. A mathematical model considering both downstream firm’s monitoring and governmental intervention is developed. Afterwards, a numerical example is presented to show the equilibriums of these models and the optimal choices of firms and government. The results show that when customers’ environmental awareness increases, both total environmental impact and social welfare decrease. The downstream firm’s monitoring will certainly reduce the total environmental impact. In most cases, it does not matter whether the downstream firm chooses to monitor the supplier or not, the total environmental impact and social welfare would not be affected when the government chooses subsidy. If a subsidy is present, firms and environment will be better than those without subsidy. Hence, the government is more likely to choose to provide subsidy and the downstream firm will not monitor the supplier’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction effort. In a few cases when environmental impact is too large, taxation may be the optimal choice for the government and the downstream firm will choose to monitor the supplier’s GHG emissions reduction investment. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-8656572 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2021 |
publisher | MDPI |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-86565722021-12-10 Influence Mechanism on Supplier Emission Reduction Based on a Two-Level Supply Chain Ma, Lina Zhang, Xinran Du, Yushen Int J Environ Res Public Health Article The purpose of this paper is to investigate environmental performance of a supply chain which consists of an upstream supplier and a downstream firm. A mathematical model considering both downstream firm’s monitoring and governmental intervention is developed. Afterwards, a numerical example is presented to show the equilibriums of these models and the optimal choices of firms and government. The results show that when customers’ environmental awareness increases, both total environmental impact and social welfare decrease. The downstream firm’s monitoring will certainly reduce the total environmental impact. In most cases, it does not matter whether the downstream firm chooses to monitor the supplier or not, the total environmental impact and social welfare would not be affected when the government chooses subsidy. If a subsidy is present, firms and environment will be better than those without subsidy. Hence, the government is more likely to choose to provide subsidy and the downstream firm will not monitor the supplier’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction effort. In a few cases when environmental impact is too large, taxation may be the optimal choice for the government and the downstream firm will choose to monitor the supplier’s GHG emissions reduction investment. MDPI 2021-11-26 /pmc/articles/PMC8656572/ /pubmed/34886165 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph182312439 Text en © 2021 by the authors. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). |
spellingShingle | Article Ma, Lina Zhang, Xinran Du, Yushen Influence Mechanism on Supplier Emission Reduction Based on a Two-Level Supply Chain |
title | Influence Mechanism on Supplier Emission Reduction Based on a Two-Level Supply Chain |
title_full | Influence Mechanism on Supplier Emission Reduction Based on a Two-Level Supply Chain |
title_fullStr | Influence Mechanism on Supplier Emission Reduction Based on a Two-Level Supply Chain |
title_full_unstemmed | Influence Mechanism on Supplier Emission Reduction Based on a Two-Level Supply Chain |
title_short | Influence Mechanism on Supplier Emission Reduction Based on a Two-Level Supply Chain |
title_sort | influence mechanism on supplier emission reduction based on a two-level supply chain |
topic | Article |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8656572/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34886165 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph182312439 |
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