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The Epistemic Value of Affective Disruptability
In order to explore how emotions contribute positively or negatively to understanding the meaning of complex socio-culturally specific phenomena, I argue that we must take into account the habitual dimension of emotions – i.e., the emotion repertoire that a feeling person acquires in the course of t...
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
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Springer Netherlands
2021
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Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8669631/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34924651 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-021-09788-5 |
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author | von Maur, Imke |
author_facet | von Maur, Imke |
author_sort | von Maur, Imke |
collection | PubMed |
description | In order to explore how emotions contribute positively or negatively to understanding the meaning of complex socio-culturally specific phenomena, I argue that we must take into account the habitual dimension of emotions – i.e., the emotion repertoire that a feeling person acquires in the course of their affective biography. This brings to light a certain form of alignment in relation to affective intentionality that is key to comprehending why humans understand situations in the way they do and why it so often is especially hard to understand things differently. A crucial epistemic problem is that subjects often do not even enter a process of understanding, i.e., they do not even start to consider a specific object, theory, circumstance, other being, etc. in different ways than the familiar one. The epistemic problem at issue thus lies in an unquestioned faith in things being right the way they are taken to be. By acknowledging the habitual dimension of affective intentionality, I analyze reasons for this inability and suggest that being affectively disruptable and cultivating a pluralistic emotion repertoire are crucial abilities to overcome this epistemic problem. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-8669631 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2021 |
publisher | Springer Netherlands |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-86696312021-12-14 The Epistemic Value of Affective Disruptability von Maur, Imke Topoi (Dordr) Article In order to explore how emotions contribute positively or negatively to understanding the meaning of complex socio-culturally specific phenomena, I argue that we must take into account the habitual dimension of emotions – i.e., the emotion repertoire that a feeling person acquires in the course of their affective biography. This brings to light a certain form of alignment in relation to affective intentionality that is key to comprehending why humans understand situations in the way they do and why it so often is especially hard to understand things differently. A crucial epistemic problem is that subjects often do not even enter a process of understanding, i.e., they do not even start to consider a specific object, theory, circumstance, other being, etc. in different ways than the familiar one. The epistemic problem at issue thus lies in an unquestioned faith in things being right the way they are taken to be. By acknowledging the habitual dimension of affective intentionality, I analyze reasons for this inability and suggest that being affectively disruptable and cultivating a pluralistic emotion repertoire are crucial abilities to overcome this epistemic problem. Springer Netherlands 2021-12-14 2022 /pmc/articles/PMC8669631/ /pubmed/34924651 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-021-09788-5 Text en © The Author(s) 2021 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Open AccessThis article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) . |
spellingShingle | Article von Maur, Imke The Epistemic Value of Affective Disruptability |
title | The Epistemic Value of Affective Disruptability |
title_full | The Epistemic Value of Affective Disruptability |
title_fullStr | The Epistemic Value of Affective Disruptability |
title_full_unstemmed | The Epistemic Value of Affective Disruptability |
title_short | The Epistemic Value of Affective Disruptability |
title_sort | epistemic value of affective disruptability |
topic | Article |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8669631/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34924651 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-021-09788-5 |
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