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Third-party punishers do not compete to be chosen as partners in an experimental game
Third-party punishment is thought to act as an honest signal of cooperative intent and such signals might escalate when competing to be chosen as a partner. Here, we investigate whether partner choice competition prompts escalating investment in third-party punishment. We also consider the case of s...
Autores principales: | , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
The Royal Society
2022
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8753170/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35016543 http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2021.1773 |
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author | Batistoni, Tommaso Barclay, Pat Raihani, Nichola J. |
author_facet | Batistoni, Tommaso Barclay, Pat Raihani, Nichola J. |
author_sort | Batistoni, Tommaso |
collection | PubMed |
description | Third-party punishment is thought to act as an honest signal of cooperative intent and such signals might escalate when competing to be chosen as a partner. Here, we investigate whether partner choice competition prompts escalating investment in third-party punishment. We also consider the case of signalling via helpful acts to provide a direct test of the relative strength of the two types of signals. Individuals invested more in third-party helping than third-party punishment and invested more in both signals when observed compared to when investments would be unseen. We found no clear effect of partner choice (over and above mere observation) on investments in either punishment or helping. Third-parties who invested more than a partner were preferentially chosen for a subsequent Trust Game although the preference to interact with the higher investor was more pronounced in the help than in the punishment condition. Third-parties who invested more were entrusted with more money and investments in third-party punishment or helping reliably signalled trustworthiness. Individuals who did not invest in third-party helping were more likely to be untrustworthy than those who did not invest in third-party punishment. This supports the conception of punishment as a more ambiguous signal of cooperative intent compared to help. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-8753170 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2022 |
publisher | The Royal Society |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-87531702022-02-04 Third-party punishers do not compete to be chosen as partners in an experimental game Batistoni, Tommaso Barclay, Pat Raihani, Nichola J. Proc Biol Sci Behaviour Third-party punishment is thought to act as an honest signal of cooperative intent and such signals might escalate when competing to be chosen as a partner. Here, we investigate whether partner choice competition prompts escalating investment in third-party punishment. We also consider the case of signalling via helpful acts to provide a direct test of the relative strength of the two types of signals. Individuals invested more in third-party helping than third-party punishment and invested more in both signals when observed compared to when investments would be unseen. We found no clear effect of partner choice (over and above mere observation) on investments in either punishment or helping. Third-parties who invested more than a partner were preferentially chosen for a subsequent Trust Game although the preference to interact with the higher investor was more pronounced in the help than in the punishment condition. Third-parties who invested more were entrusted with more money and investments in third-party punishment or helping reliably signalled trustworthiness. Individuals who did not invest in third-party helping were more likely to be untrustworthy than those who did not invest in third-party punishment. This supports the conception of punishment as a more ambiguous signal of cooperative intent compared to help. The Royal Society 2022-01-12 2022-01-12 /pmc/articles/PMC8753170/ /pubmed/35016543 http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2021.1773 Text en © 2022 The Authors. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) , which permits unrestricted use, provided the original author and source are credited. |
spellingShingle | Behaviour Batistoni, Tommaso Barclay, Pat Raihani, Nichola J. Third-party punishers do not compete to be chosen as partners in an experimental game |
title | Third-party punishers do not compete to be chosen as partners in an experimental game |
title_full | Third-party punishers do not compete to be chosen as partners in an experimental game |
title_fullStr | Third-party punishers do not compete to be chosen as partners in an experimental game |
title_full_unstemmed | Third-party punishers do not compete to be chosen as partners in an experimental game |
title_short | Third-party punishers do not compete to be chosen as partners in an experimental game |
title_sort | third-party punishers do not compete to be chosen as partners in an experimental game |
topic | Behaviour |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8753170/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35016543 http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2021.1773 |
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