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Third-party punishers do not compete to be chosen as partners in an experimental game
Third-party punishment is thought to act as an honest signal of cooperative intent and such signals might escalate when competing to be chosen as a partner. Here, we investigate whether partner choice competition prompts escalating investment in third-party punishment. We also consider the case of s...
| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
| Lenguaje: | English |
| Publicado: |
The Royal Society
2022
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8753170/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35016543 http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2021.1773 |