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Selfish risk-seeking can provide an evolutionary advantage in a conditional public goods game
While cooperation and risk aversion are considered to be evolutionarily advantageous in many circumstances, and selfish or risky behaviour can bring negative consequences for individuals and the community at large, selfish and risk-seeking behaviour is still often observed in human societies. In thi...
Autores principales: | , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Public Library of Science
2022
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8782365/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35061703 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0261340 |
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author | Testori, Martina Eisenbarth, Hedwig Hoyle, Rebecca B. |
author_facet | Testori, Martina Eisenbarth, Hedwig Hoyle, Rebecca B. |
author_sort | Testori, Martina |
collection | PubMed |
description | While cooperation and risk aversion are considered to be evolutionarily advantageous in many circumstances, and selfish or risky behaviour can bring negative consequences for individuals and the community at large, selfish and risk-seeking behaviour is still often observed in human societies. In this paper we consider whether there are environmental and social conditions that favour selfish risk-seeking individuals within a community and whether tolerating such individuals may provide benefits to the community itself in some circumstances. We built an agent-based model including two types of agent—selfish risk-seeking and generous risk-averse—that harvest resources from the environment and share them (or not) with their community. We found that selfish risk-seekers can outperform generous risk-averse agents in conditions where their survival is moderately challenged, supporting the theory that selfish and risk-seeking traits combined are not dysfunctional but rather can be evolutionarily advantageous for agents. The benefit for communities is less clear, but when generous agents are unconditionally cooperative communities with a greater proportion of selfish risk-seeking agents grow to a larger population size suggesting some advantage to the community overall. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-8782365 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2022 |
publisher | Public Library of Science |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-87823652022-01-22 Selfish risk-seeking can provide an evolutionary advantage in a conditional public goods game Testori, Martina Eisenbarth, Hedwig Hoyle, Rebecca B. PLoS One Research Article While cooperation and risk aversion are considered to be evolutionarily advantageous in many circumstances, and selfish or risky behaviour can bring negative consequences for individuals and the community at large, selfish and risk-seeking behaviour is still often observed in human societies. In this paper we consider whether there are environmental and social conditions that favour selfish risk-seeking individuals within a community and whether tolerating such individuals may provide benefits to the community itself in some circumstances. We built an agent-based model including two types of agent—selfish risk-seeking and generous risk-averse—that harvest resources from the environment and share them (or not) with their community. We found that selfish risk-seekers can outperform generous risk-averse agents in conditions where their survival is moderately challenged, supporting the theory that selfish and risk-seeking traits combined are not dysfunctional but rather can be evolutionarily advantageous for agents. The benefit for communities is less clear, but when generous agents are unconditionally cooperative communities with a greater proportion of selfish risk-seeking agents grow to a larger population size suggesting some advantage to the community overall. Public Library of Science 2022-01-21 /pmc/articles/PMC8782365/ /pubmed/35061703 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0261340 Text en © 2022 Testori et al https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) , which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. |
spellingShingle | Research Article Testori, Martina Eisenbarth, Hedwig Hoyle, Rebecca B. Selfish risk-seeking can provide an evolutionary advantage in a conditional public goods game |
title | Selfish risk-seeking can provide an evolutionary advantage in a conditional public goods game |
title_full | Selfish risk-seeking can provide an evolutionary advantage in a conditional public goods game |
title_fullStr | Selfish risk-seeking can provide an evolutionary advantage in a conditional public goods game |
title_full_unstemmed | Selfish risk-seeking can provide an evolutionary advantage in a conditional public goods game |
title_short | Selfish risk-seeking can provide an evolutionary advantage in a conditional public goods game |
title_sort | selfish risk-seeking can provide an evolutionary advantage in a conditional public goods game |
topic | Research Article |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8782365/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35061703 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0261340 |
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