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Does Federalism Prevent Democratic Accountability? Assigning Responsibility for Rates of COVID-19 Testing

Does federalism prevent citizens from holding governments accountable for their actions? The pandemic represents the ideal scenario for testing the effects of federalism on democratic accountability because citizens are highly motivated to hold governments accountable for preventing or failing to pr...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Kennedy, John, Sayers, Anthony, Alcantara, Christopher
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: SAGE Publications 2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8805446/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35125970
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/14789299211001690
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author Kennedy, John
Sayers, Anthony
Alcantara, Christopher
author_facet Kennedy, John
Sayers, Anthony
Alcantara, Christopher
author_sort Kennedy, John
collection PubMed
description Does federalism prevent citizens from holding governments accountable for their actions? The pandemic represents the ideal scenario for testing the effects of federalism on democratic accountability because citizens are highly motivated to hold governments accountable for preventing or failing to prevent the rapid transmission of the virus. Previous research suggests that a number of institutional and political factors complicate the accountability function in federal systems. We add to this literature by assessing the effect of one political factor, exclusivity (measured in terms of policy variation at one level), on accountability. The coronavirus pandemic provides a unique opportunity to assess this factor given the high levels of issue saliency, media attention, and low levels of intergovernmental and interparty conflict it has generated. Drawing on original data from the May 2020 Democratic Checkup Survey and public data from the Canadian National Microbiology Laboratory, our preliminary findings suggest that interprovincial policy variation with respect to coronavirus testing is not correlated with public assessments of the adequacy of provincial testing, and so it seems that Canadians are not able to assign responsibility to the correct level of government despite ideal conditions for doing so.
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spelling pubmed-88054462022-02-02 Does Federalism Prevent Democratic Accountability? Assigning Responsibility for Rates of COVID-19 Testing Kennedy, John Sayers, Anthony Alcantara, Christopher Polit Stud Rev Early Results Does federalism prevent citizens from holding governments accountable for their actions? The pandemic represents the ideal scenario for testing the effects of federalism on democratic accountability because citizens are highly motivated to hold governments accountable for preventing or failing to prevent the rapid transmission of the virus. Previous research suggests that a number of institutional and political factors complicate the accountability function in federal systems. We add to this literature by assessing the effect of one political factor, exclusivity (measured in terms of policy variation at one level), on accountability. The coronavirus pandemic provides a unique opportunity to assess this factor given the high levels of issue saliency, media attention, and low levels of intergovernmental and interparty conflict it has generated. Drawing on original data from the May 2020 Democratic Checkup Survey and public data from the Canadian National Microbiology Laboratory, our preliminary findings suggest that interprovincial policy variation with respect to coronavirus testing is not correlated with public assessments of the adequacy of provincial testing, and so it seems that Canadians are not able to assign responsibility to the correct level of government despite ideal conditions for doing so. SAGE Publications 2021-04-05 2022-02 /pmc/articles/PMC8805446/ /pubmed/35125970 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/14789299211001690 Text en © The Author(s) 2021 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) which permits non-commercial use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).
spellingShingle Early Results
Kennedy, John
Sayers, Anthony
Alcantara, Christopher
Does Federalism Prevent Democratic Accountability? Assigning Responsibility for Rates of COVID-19 Testing
title Does Federalism Prevent Democratic Accountability? Assigning Responsibility for Rates of COVID-19 Testing
title_full Does Federalism Prevent Democratic Accountability? Assigning Responsibility for Rates of COVID-19 Testing
title_fullStr Does Federalism Prevent Democratic Accountability? Assigning Responsibility for Rates of COVID-19 Testing
title_full_unstemmed Does Federalism Prevent Democratic Accountability? Assigning Responsibility for Rates of COVID-19 Testing
title_short Does Federalism Prevent Democratic Accountability? Assigning Responsibility for Rates of COVID-19 Testing
title_sort does federalism prevent democratic accountability? assigning responsibility for rates of covid-19 testing
topic Early Results
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8805446/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35125970
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/14789299211001690
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