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Is it all about the feeling? Affective and (meta-)cognitive mechanisms underlying the truth effect
People are more likely to judge repeatedly perceived statements as true. A decisive explanation for this so-called truth effect is that the repeated information can be processed more fluently than new information and that this fluency experience renders the information more familiar and trustworthy....
Autores principales: | , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
2021
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8821071/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33484352 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00426-020-01459-1 |
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author | Stump, Annika Rummel, Jan Voss, Andreas |
author_facet | Stump, Annika Rummel, Jan Voss, Andreas |
author_sort | Stump, Annika |
collection | PubMed |
description | People are more likely to judge repeatedly perceived statements as true. A decisive explanation for this so-called truth effect is that the repeated information can be processed more fluently than new information and that this fluency experience renders the information more familiar and trustworthy. Little is known, however, regarding whether and how affective states and dispositional cognitive preferences influence the truth effect. To this end, we conducted two experiments in which we manipulated (a) processing fluency via repetition, (b) the time interval (10 min vs. 1 week) between repetitions, and (c) short-term affective states using the presentation of emotional faces (Experiment 1) or the presence of an irrelevant source for changes in affective states (Experiment 2). Additionally, we assessed the dispositional variables need for cognitive closure (NCC), preference for deliberation (PD) and preference for intuition (PI). Results of Experiment 1 showed that the truth effect was significantly reduced for statements that were followed by a negative prime, although this was the case only for the longer repetition lag. Furthermore, higher NCC and lower PD scores were associated with an increased truth effect. Results of Experiment 2 replicated the moderating role of NCC and further showed that participants, who were provided with an alternative source for changes in their affective states, showed a reduced truth effect. Together, the findings suggest that (a) fluency-related changes in affective states may be (co-)responsible for the truth effect, (b) the truth effect is decreased when the repetition interval is long rather than short, and (c) the truth effect is increased for individuals with a higher need for cognitive closure. Theoretical implications of these findings are discussed. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-8821071 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2021 |
publisher | Springer Berlin Heidelberg |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-88210712022-02-22 Is it all about the feeling? Affective and (meta-)cognitive mechanisms underlying the truth effect Stump, Annika Rummel, Jan Voss, Andreas Psychol Res Original Article People are more likely to judge repeatedly perceived statements as true. A decisive explanation for this so-called truth effect is that the repeated information can be processed more fluently than new information and that this fluency experience renders the information more familiar and trustworthy. Little is known, however, regarding whether and how affective states and dispositional cognitive preferences influence the truth effect. To this end, we conducted two experiments in which we manipulated (a) processing fluency via repetition, (b) the time interval (10 min vs. 1 week) between repetitions, and (c) short-term affective states using the presentation of emotional faces (Experiment 1) or the presence of an irrelevant source for changes in affective states (Experiment 2). Additionally, we assessed the dispositional variables need for cognitive closure (NCC), preference for deliberation (PD) and preference for intuition (PI). Results of Experiment 1 showed that the truth effect was significantly reduced for statements that were followed by a negative prime, although this was the case only for the longer repetition lag. Furthermore, higher NCC and lower PD scores were associated with an increased truth effect. Results of Experiment 2 replicated the moderating role of NCC and further showed that participants, who were provided with an alternative source for changes in their affective states, showed a reduced truth effect. Together, the findings suggest that (a) fluency-related changes in affective states may be (co-)responsible for the truth effect, (b) the truth effect is decreased when the repetition interval is long rather than short, and (c) the truth effect is increased for individuals with a higher need for cognitive closure. Theoretical implications of these findings are discussed. Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2021-01-23 2022 /pmc/articles/PMC8821071/ /pubmed/33484352 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00426-020-01459-1 Text en © The Author(s) 2021 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Open AccessThis article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) . |
spellingShingle | Original Article Stump, Annika Rummel, Jan Voss, Andreas Is it all about the feeling? Affective and (meta-)cognitive mechanisms underlying the truth effect |
title | Is it all about the feeling? Affective and (meta-)cognitive mechanisms underlying the truth effect |
title_full | Is it all about the feeling? Affective and (meta-)cognitive mechanisms underlying the truth effect |
title_fullStr | Is it all about the feeling? Affective and (meta-)cognitive mechanisms underlying the truth effect |
title_full_unstemmed | Is it all about the feeling? Affective and (meta-)cognitive mechanisms underlying the truth effect |
title_short | Is it all about the feeling? Affective and (meta-)cognitive mechanisms underlying the truth effect |
title_sort | is it all about the feeling? affective and (meta-)cognitive mechanisms underlying the truth effect |
topic | Original Article |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8821071/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33484352 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00426-020-01459-1 |
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