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Do Largest Shareholders Incentively Affect Financial Sustainability Under Holdings Heterogeneity? Regulation/Intermediary of Financial Constraints Through Managerial Behavior Games
The real estate industry is characterized by a high degree of financial intensity and is more significant in certain areas. The relative enterprises require certain financial ability and large shareholders’ controlling power to support their survivals and competitiveness. However, due to the multipl...
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
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Frontiers Media S.A.
2022
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Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8873080/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35222177 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.754608 |
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author | Zhang, Lipai |
author_facet | Zhang, Lipai |
author_sort | Zhang, Lipai |
collection | PubMed |
description | The real estate industry is characterized by a high degree of financial intensity and is more significant in certain areas. The relative enterprises require certain financial ability and large shareholders’ controlling power to support their survivals and competitiveness. However, due to the multiple adverse impacts of current state policies on banks and private capital, the problem of capital restraints of real estate has become increasingly serious. From a corporate governance perspective, this paper studies the interactions among financial constraints, ownership concentration and corporate performance under different shareholding states: by analyzing the quantitative characteristics of equity structure and searching for the appropriate range of the largest shareholder holding ratio, which has considered both the financial sustainability and characteristics. It is found that raising the ownership concentration could enhance supervision effect rather than encroachment, effectively ease the financial constraints and improve the performance of enterprises, both of which are significant under high ownership concentration. Financial constraints play a significant intermediary effect in absolute holdings and have obvious regulatory effects in decentralized equity. Also, the mechanisms of ownership concentration are reflected in the strengthening of corporate supervision, reduced agency costs, improved operating efficiency, and increased investment attractiveness. The adjusted behavior adds to the responsibility awareness rather than free-ride psychology, forming a dynamic game on financial decisions. Their financial sustainability in areas would provide a nationwide reference for governance reform and managerial behavior. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-8873080 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2022 |
publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-88730802022-02-26 Do Largest Shareholders Incentively Affect Financial Sustainability Under Holdings Heterogeneity? Regulation/Intermediary of Financial Constraints Through Managerial Behavior Games Zhang, Lipai Front Psychol Psychology The real estate industry is characterized by a high degree of financial intensity and is more significant in certain areas. The relative enterprises require certain financial ability and large shareholders’ controlling power to support their survivals and competitiveness. However, due to the multiple adverse impacts of current state policies on banks and private capital, the problem of capital restraints of real estate has become increasingly serious. From a corporate governance perspective, this paper studies the interactions among financial constraints, ownership concentration and corporate performance under different shareholding states: by analyzing the quantitative characteristics of equity structure and searching for the appropriate range of the largest shareholder holding ratio, which has considered both the financial sustainability and characteristics. It is found that raising the ownership concentration could enhance supervision effect rather than encroachment, effectively ease the financial constraints and improve the performance of enterprises, both of which are significant under high ownership concentration. Financial constraints play a significant intermediary effect in absolute holdings and have obvious regulatory effects in decentralized equity. Also, the mechanisms of ownership concentration are reflected in the strengthening of corporate supervision, reduced agency costs, improved operating efficiency, and increased investment attractiveness. The adjusted behavior adds to the responsibility awareness rather than free-ride psychology, forming a dynamic game on financial decisions. Their financial sustainability in areas would provide a nationwide reference for governance reform and managerial behavior. Frontiers Media S.A. 2022-02-10 /pmc/articles/PMC8873080/ /pubmed/35222177 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.754608 Text en Copyright © 2022 Zhang. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms. |
spellingShingle | Psychology Zhang, Lipai Do Largest Shareholders Incentively Affect Financial Sustainability Under Holdings Heterogeneity? Regulation/Intermediary of Financial Constraints Through Managerial Behavior Games |
title | Do Largest Shareholders Incentively Affect Financial Sustainability Under Holdings Heterogeneity? Regulation/Intermediary of Financial Constraints Through Managerial Behavior Games |
title_full | Do Largest Shareholders Incentively Affect Financial Sustainability Under Holdings Heterogeneity? Regulation/Intermediary of Financial Constraints Through Managerial Behavior Games |
title_fullStr | Do Largest Shareholders Incentively Affect Financial Sustainability Under Holdings Heterogeneity? Regulation/Intermediary of Financial Constraints Through Managerial Behavior Games |
title_full_unstemmed | Do Largest Shareholders Incentively Affect Financial Sustainability Under Holdings Heterogeneity? Regulation/Intermediary of Financial Constraints Through Managerial Behavior Games |
title_short | Do Largest Shareholders Incentively Affect Financial Sustainability Under Holdings Heterogeneity? Regulation/Intermediary of Financial Constraints Through Managerial Behavior Games |
title_sort | do largest shareholders incentively affect financial sustainability under holdings heterogeneity? regulation/intermediary of financial constraints through managerial behavior games |
topic | Psychology |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8873080/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35222177 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.754608 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT zhanglipai dolargestshareholdersincentivelyaffectfinancialsustainabilityunderholdingsheterogeneityregulationintermediaryoffinancialconstraintsthroughmanagerialbehaviorgames |