Existence of equilibria in repeated games with long-run payoffs

We consider repeated games with tail-measurable payoffs, i.e., when the payoffs depend only on what happens in the long run. We show that every repeated game with tail-measurable payoffs admits an ε-equilibrium, for every [Formula: see text] , provided that the set of players is finite or countably...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit, Flesch, János, Predtetchinski, Arkadi, Solan, Eilon
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: National Academy of Sciences 2022
Materias:
Physical Sciences
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8931206/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35259010
http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2105867119
_version_ 1784671206164660224
author Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit
Flesch, János
Predtetchinski, Arkadi
Solan, Eilon
author_facet Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit
Flesch, János
Predtetchinski, Arkadi
Solan, Eilon
author_sort Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit
collection PubMed
description We consider repeated games with tail-measurable payoffs, i.e., when the payoffs depend only on what happens in the long run. We show that every repeated game with tail-measurable payoffs admits an ε-equilibrium, for every [Formula: see text] , provided that the set of players is finite or countably infinite and the action sets are finite. The proof relies on techniques from stochastic games and from alternating-move games with Borel-measurable payoffs.
format Online
Article
Text
id pubmed-8931206
institution National Center for Biotechnology Information
language English
publishDate 2022
publisher National Academy of Sciences
record_format MEDLINE/PubMed
spelling pubmed-89312062022-09-08 Existence of equilibria in repeated games with long-run payoffs Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit Flesch, János Predtetchinski, Arkadi Solan, Eilon Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A Physical Sciences We consider repeated games with tail-measurable payoffs, i.e., when the payoffs depend only on what happens in the long run. We show that every repeated game with tail-measurable payoffs admits an ε-equilibrium, for every [Formula: see text] , provided that the set of players is finite or countably infinite and the action sets are finite. The proof relies on techniques from stochastic games and from alternating-move games with Borel-measurable payoffs. National Academy of Sciences 2022-03-08 2022-03-15 /pmc/articles/PMC8931206/ /pubmed/35259010 http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2105867119 Text en Copyright © 2022 the Author(s). Published by PNAS. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/This article is distributed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License 4.0 (CC BY-NC-ND) (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/) .
spellingShingle Physical Sciences
Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit
Flesch, János
Predtetchinski, Arkadi
Solan, Eilon
Existence of equilibria in repeated games with long-run payoffs
title Existence of equilibria in repeated games with long-run payoffs
title_full Existence of equilibria in repeated games with long-run payoffs
title_fullStr Existence of equilibria in repeated games with long-run payoffs
title_full_unstemmed Existence of equilibria in repeated games with long-run payoffs
title_short Existence of equilibria in repeated games with long-run payoffs
title_sort existence of equilibria in repeated games with long-run payoffs
topic Physical Sciences
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8931206/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35259010
http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2105867119
work_keys_str_mv AT ashkenazigolangalit existenceofequilibriainrepeatedgameswithlongrunpayoffs
AT fleschjanos existenceofequilibriainrepeatedgameswithlongrunpayoffs
AT predtetchinskiarkadi existenceofequilibriainrepeatedgameswithlongrunpayoffs
AT solaneilon existenceofequilibriainrepeatedgameswithlongrunpayoffs

Ejemplares similares