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Existence of equilibria in repeated games with long-run payoffs
We consider repeated games with tail-measurable payoffs, i.e., when the payoffs depend only on what happens in the long run. We show that every repeated game with tail-measurable payoffs admits an ε-equilibrium, for every [Formula: see text] , provided that the set of players is finite or countably...
| Autores principales: | , , , |
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| Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
| Lenguaje: | English |
| Publicado: |
National Academy of Sciences
2022
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8931206/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35259010 http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2105867119 |