Pain priors, polyeidism, and predictive power: a preliminary investigation into individual differences in ordinary thought about pain

According to standard philosophical and clinical understandings, pain is an essentially mental phenomenon (typically, a kind of conscious experience). In a challenge to this standard conception, a recent burst of empirical work in experimental philosophy, such as that by Justin Sytsma and Kevin Reut...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Borg, Emma, Fisher, Sarah A., Hansen, Nat, Harrison, Richard, Ravindran, Deepak, Salomons, Tim V., Wilkinson, Harriet
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Springer Netherlands 2021
Materias:
Article
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8938353/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34919174
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11017-021-09552-1

Internet

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8938353/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34919174
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11017-021-09552-1

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