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Great apes and human children rationally monitor their decisions

Several species can detect when they are uncertain about what decision to make—revealed by opting out of the choice, or by seeking more information before deciding. However, we do not know whether any nonhuman animals recognize when they need more information to make a decision because new evidence...

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Autores principales: O'Madagain, Cathal, Helming, Katharina A., Schmidt, Marco F. H., Shupe, Eli, Call, Josep, Tomasello, Michael
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: The Royal Society 2022
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8941383/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35317676
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2021.2686
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author O'Madagain, Cathal
Helming, Katharina A.
Schmidt, Marco F. H.
Shupe, Eli
Call, Josep
Tomasello, Michael
author_facet O'Madagain, Cathal
Helming, Katharina A.
Schmidt, Marco F. H.
Shupe, Eli
Call, Josep
Tomasello, Michael
author_sort O'Madagain, Cathal
collection PubMed
description Several species can detect when they are uncertain about what decision to make—revealed by opting out of the choice, or by seeking more information before deciding. However, we do not know whether any nonhuman animals recognize when they need more information to make a decision because new evidence contradicts an already-formed belief. Here, we explore this ability in great apes and human children. First, we show that after great apes saw new evidence contradicting their belief about which of two rewards was greater, they stopped to recheck the evidence for their belief before deciding. This indicates the ability to keep track of the reasons for their decisions, or 'rational monitoring' of the decision-making process. Children did the same at 5 years of age, but not at 3 years. In a second study, participants formed a belief about a reward's location, but then a social partner contradicted them, by picking the opposite location. This time even 3-year-old children rechecked the evidence, while apes ignored the disagreement. While apes were sensitive only to the conflict in physical evidence, the youngest children were more sensitive to peer disagreement than conflicting physical evidence.
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spelling pubmed-89413832022-11-22 Great apes and human children rationally monitor their decisions O'Madagain, Cathal Helming, Katharina A. Schmidt, Marco F. H. Shupe, Eli Call, Josep Tomasello, Michael Proc Biol Sci Neuroscience and Cognition Several species can detect when they are uncertain about what decision to make—revealed by opting out of the choice, or by seeking more information before deciding. However, we do not know whether any nonhuman animals recognize when they need more information to make a decision because new evidence contradicts an already-formed belief. Here, we explore this ability in great apes and human children. First, we show that after great apes saw new evidence contradicting their belief about which of two rewards was greater, they stopped to recheck the evidence for their belief before deciding. This indicates the ability to keep track of the reasons for their decisions, or 'rational monitoring' of the decision-making process. Children did the same at 5 years of age, but not at 3 years. In a second study, participants formed a belief about a reward's location, but then a social partner contradicted them, by picking the opposite location. This time even 3-year-old children rechecked the evidence, while apes ignored the disagreement. While apes were sensitive only to the conflict in physical evidence, the youngest children were more sensitive to peer disagreement than conflicting physical evidence. The Royal Society 2022-03-30 2022-03-23 /pmc/articles/PMC8941383/ /pubmed/35317676 http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2021.2686 Text en © 2022 The Authors. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) , which permits unrestricted use, provided the original author and source are credited.
spellingShingle Neuroscience and Cognition
O'Madagain, Cathal
Helming, Katharina A.
Schmidt, Marco F. H.
Shupe, Eli
Call, Josep
Tomasello, Michael
Great apes and human children rationally monitor their decisions
title Great apes and human children rationally monitor their decisions
title_full Great apes and human children rationally monitor their decisions
title_fullStr Great apes and human children rationally monitor their decisions
title_full_unstemmed Great apes and human children rationally monitor their decisions
title_short Great apes and human children rationally monitor their decisions
title_sort great apes and human children rationally monitor their decisions
topic Neuroscience and Cognition
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8941383/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35317676
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2021.2686
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