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Great apes and human children rationally monitor their decisions
Several species can detect when they are uncertain about what decision to make—revealed by opting out of the choice, or by seeking more information before deciding. However, we do not know whether any nonhuman animals recognize when they need more information to make a decision because new evidence...
Autores principales: | , , , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
The Royal Society
2022
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8941383/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35317676 http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2021.2686 |
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author | O'Madagain, Cathal Helming, Katharina A. Schmidt, Marco F. H. Shupe, Eli Call, Josep Tomasello, Michael |
author_facet | O'Madagain, Cathal Helming, Katharina A. Schmidt, Marco F. H. Shupe, Eli Call, Josep Tomasello, Michael |
author_sort | O'Madagain, Cathal |
collection | PubMed |
description | Several species can detect when they are uncertain about what decision to make—revealed by opting out of the choice, or by seeking more information before deciding. However, we do not know whether any nonhuman animals recognize when they need more information to make a decision because new evidence contradicts an already-formed belief. Here, we explore this ability in great apes and human children. First, we show that after great apes saw new evidence contradicting their belief about which of two rewards was greater, they stopped to recheck the evidence for their belief before deciding. This indicates the ability to keep track of the reasons for their decisions, or 'rational monitoring' of the decision-making process. Children did the same at 5 years of age, but not at 3 years. In a second study, participants formed a belief about a reward's location, but then a social partner contradicted them, by picking the opposite location. This time even 3-year-old children rechecked the evidence, while apes ignored the disagreement. While apes were sensitive only to the conflict in physical evidence, the youngest children were more sensitive to peer disagreement than conflicting physical evidence. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-8941383 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2022 |
publisher | The Royal Society |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-89413832022-11-22 Great apes and human children rationally monitor their decisions O'Madagain, Cathal Helming, Katharina A. Schmidt, Marco F. H. Shupe, Eli Call, Josep Tomasello, Michael Proc Biol Sci Neuroscience and Cognition Several species can detect when they are uncertain about what decision to make—revealed by opting out of the choice, or by seeking more information before deciding. However, we do not know whether any nonhuman animals recognize when they need more information to make a decision because new evidence contradicts an already-formed belief. Here, we explore this ability in great apes and human children. First, we show that after great apes saw new evidence contradicting their belief about which of two rewards was greater, they stopped to recheck the evidence for their belief before deciding. This indicates the ability to keep track of the reasons for their decisions, or 'rational monitoring' of the decision-making process. Children did the same at 5 years of age, but not at 3 years. In a second study, participants formed a belief about a reward's location, but then a social partner contradicted them, by picking the opposite location. This time even 3-year-old children rechecked the evidence, while apes ignored the disagreement. While apes were sensitive only to the conflict in physical evidence, the youngest children were more sensitive to peer disagreement than conflicting physical evidence. The Royal Society 2022-03-30 2022-03-23 /pmc/articles/PMC8941383/ /pubmed/35317676 http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2021.2686 Text en © 2022 The Authors. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) , which permits unrestricted use, provided the original author and source are credited. |
spellingShingle | Neuroscience and Cognition O'Madagain, Cathal Helming, Katharina A. Schmidt, Marco F. H. Shupe, Eli Call, Josep Tomasello, Michael Great apes and human children rationally monitor their decisions |
title | Great apes and human children rationally monitor their decisions |
title_full | Great apes and human children rationally monitor their decisions |
title_fullStr | Great apes and human children rationally monitor their decisions |
title_full_unstemmed | Great apes and human children rationally monitor their decisions |
title_short | Great apes and human children rationally monitor their decisions |
title_sort | great apes and human children rationally monitor their decisions |
topic | Neuroscience and Cognition |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8941383/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35317676 http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2021.2686 |
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