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Four Puzzles of Reputation-Based Cooperation: Content, Process, Honesty, and Structure
Research in various disciplines has highlighted that humans are uniquely able to solve the problem of cooperation through the informal mechanisms of reputation and gossip. Reputation coordinates the evaluative judgments of individuals about one another. Direct observation of actions and communicatio...
Autores principales: | Giardini, Francesca, Balliet, Daniel, Power, Eleanor A., Számadó, Szabolcs, Takács, Károly |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Springer US
2021
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8964644/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34961914 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12110-021-09419-3 |
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