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Optimal vaccine subsidies for endemic diseases()

In Goodkin-Gold et al. (2021), we analyzed optimal subsidies for a vaccine against an epidemic outbreak like Covid-19. This companion paper alters the underlying epidemiological model to suit endemic diseases requiring continuous vaccination of new cohorts—also suiting an epidemic like Covid-19 if,...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Goodkin-Gold, Matthew, Kremer, Michael, Snyder, Christopher M., Williams, Heidi
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. 2022
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8975799/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35400771
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2022.102840
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author Goodkin-Gold, Matthew
Kremer, Michael
Snyder, Christopher M.
Williams, Heidi
author_facet Goodkin-Gold, Matthew
Kremer, Michael
Snyder, Christopher M.
Williams, Heidi
author_sort Goodkin-Gold, Matthew
collection PubMed
description In Goodkin-Gold et al. (2021), we analyzed optimal subsidies for a vaccine against an epidemic outbreak like Covid-19. This companion paper alters the underlying epidemiological model to suit endemic diseases requiring continuous vaccination of new cohorts—also suiting an epidemic like Covid-19 if, following Gans (2020), one assumes peaks are leveled by social distancing. We obtain qualitatively similar results: across market structures ranging from perfect competition to monopoly, the subsidy needed to induce first-best vaccination coverage on the private market is highest for moderately infectious diseases, which invite the most free riding; extremely infectious diseases drive more consumers to become vaccinated, attenuating externalities. Stylized calibrations to HIV, among other diseases, suggest that first-best subsidies can be exorbitantly high when suppliers have market power, rationalizing alternative policies observed in practice such as bulk purchases negotiated by the government on behalf of the consumers.
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spelling pubmed-89757992022-04-04 Optimal vaccine subsidies for endemic diseases() Goodkin-Gold, Matthew Kremer, Michael Snyder, Christopher M. Williams, Heidi Int J Ind Organ Article In Goodkin-Gold et al. (2021), we analyzed optimal subsidies for a vaccine against an epidemic outbreak like Covid-19. This companion paper alters the underlying epidemiological model to suit endemic diseases requiring continuous vaccination of new cohorts—also suiting an epidemic like Covid-19 if, following Gans (2020), one assumes peaks are leveled by social distancing. We obtain qualitatively similar results: across market structures ranging from perfect competition to monopoly, the subsidy needed to induce first-best vaccination coverage on the private market is highest for moderately infectious diseases, which invite the most free riding; extremely infectious diseases drive more consumers to become vaccinated, attenuating externalities. Stylized calibrations to HIV, among other diseases, suggest that first-best subsidies can be exorbitantly high when suppliers have market power, rationalizing alternative policies observed in practice such as bulk purchases negotiated by the government on behalf of the consumers. The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. 2022-09 2022-04-02 /pmc/articles/PMC8975799/ /pubmed/35400771 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2022.102840 Text en © 2022 The Author(s) Since January 2020 Elsevier has created a COVID-19 resource centre with free information in English and Mandarin on the novel coronavirus COVID-19. The COVID-19 resource centre is hosted on Elsevier Connect, the company's public news and information website. Elsevier hereby grants permission to make all its COVID-19-related research that is available on the COVID-19 resource centre - including this research content - immediately available in PubMed Central and other publicly funded repositories, such as the WHO COVID database with rights for unrestricted research re-use and analyses in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for free by Elsevier for as long as the COVID-19 resource centre remains active.
spellingShingle Article
Goodkin-Gold, Matthew
Kremer, Michael
Snyder, Christopher M.
Williams, Heidi
Optimal vaccine subsidies for endemic diseases()
title Optimal vaccine subsidies for endemic diseases()
title_full Optimal vaccine subsidies for endemic diseases()
title_fullStr Optimal vaccine subsidies for endemic diseases()
title_full_unstemmed Optimal vaccine subsidies for endemic diseases()
title_short Optimal vaccine subsidies for endemic diseases()
title_sort optimal vaccine subsidies for endemic diseases()
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8975799/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35400771
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2022.102840
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