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Fast Constant-Time Modular Inversion over [Formula: see text] Resistant to Simple Power Analysis Attacks for IoT Applications

The advent of the Internet of Things (IoT) has enabled millions of potential new uses for consumers and businesses. However, with these new uses emerge some of the more pronounced risks in the connected object domain. Finite fields play a crucial role in many public-key cryptographic algorithms (PKC...

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Autores principales: Sghaier, Anissa, Zeghid, Medien, Massoud, Chiraz, Ahmed, Hassan Yousif, Chehri, Abdellah, Machhout, Mohsen
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: MDPI 2022
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9002486/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35408148
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/s22072535
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author Sghaier, Anissa
Zeghid, Medien
Massoud, Chiraz
Ahmed, Hassan Yousif
Chehri, Abdellah
Machhout, Mohsen
author_facet Sghaier, Anissa
Zeghid, Medien
Massoud, Chiraz
Ahmed, Hassan Yousif
Chehri, Abdellah
Machhout, Mohsen
author_sort Sghaier, Anissa
collection PubMed
description The advent of the Internet of Things (IoT) has enabled millions of potential new uses for consumers and businesses. However, with these new uses emerge some of the more pronounced risks in the connected object domain. Finite fields play a crucial role in many public-key cryptographic algorithms (PKCs), which are used extensively for the security and privacy of IoT devices, consumer electronic equipment, and software systems. Given that inversion is the most sensitive and costly finite field arithmetic operation in PKCs, this paper proposes a new, fast, constant-time inverter over prime fields [Formula: see text] based on the traditional Binary Extended Euclidean (BEE) algorithm. A modified BEE algorithm (MBEEA) resistant to simple power analysis attacks (SPA) is presented, and the design performance area-delay over [Formula: see text] is explored. Furthermore, the BEE algorithm, modular addition, and subtraction are revisited to optimize and balance the MBEEA signal flow and resource utilization efficiency. The proposed MBEEA architecture was implemented and tested on Xilinx FPGA Virtex #5, #6, and #7 devices. Our implementation over [Formula: see text] (length of p = 256 bits) with 2035 slices achieved one modular inversion in only 1.12 μs on Virtex-7. Finally, we conducted a thorough comparison and performance analysis to demonstrate that the proposed design outperforms the competing designs, i.e., has a lower area-delay product (ADP) than the reported inverters.
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spelling pubmed-90024862022-04-13 Fast Constant-Time Modular Inversion over [Formula: see text] Resistant to Simple Power Analysis Attacks for IoT Applications Sghaier, Anissa Zeghid, Medien Massoud, Chiraz Ahmed, Hassan Yousif Chehri, Abdellah Machhout, Mohsen Sensors (Basel) Article The advent of the Internet of Things (IoT) has enabled millions of potential new uses for consumers and businesses. However, with these new uses emerge some of the more pronounced risks in the connected object domain. Finite fields play a crucial role in many public-key cryptographic algorithms (PKCs), which are used extensively for the security and privacy of IoT devices, consumer electronic equipment, and software systems. Given that inversion is the most sensitive and costly finite field arithmetic operation in PKCs, this paper proposes a new, fast, constant-time inverter over prime fields [Formula: see text] based on the traditional Binary Extended Euclidean (BEE) algorithm. A modified BEE algorithm (MBEEA) resistant to simple power analysis attacks (SPA) is presented, and the design performance area-delay over [Formula: see text] is explored. Furthermore, the BEE algorithm, modular addition, and subtraction are revisited to optimize and balance the MBEEA signal flow and resource utilization efficiency. The proposed MBEEA architecture was implemented and tested on Xilinx FPGA Virtex #5, #6, and #7 devices. Our implementation over [Formula: see text] (length of p = 256 bits) with 2035 slices achieved one modular inversion in only 1.12 μs on Virtex-7. Finally, we conducted a thorough comparison and performance analysis to demonstrate that the proposed design outperforms the competing designs, i.e., has a lower area-delay product (ADP) than the reported inverters. MDPI 2022-03-25 /pmc/articles/PMC9002486/ /pubmed/35408148 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/s22072535 Text en © 2022 by the authors. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
spellingShingle Article
Sghaier, Anissa
Zeghid, Medien
Massoud, Chiraz
Ahmed, Hassan Yousif
Chehri, Abdellah
Machhout, Mohsen
Fast Constant-Time Modular Inversion over [Formula: see text] Resistant to Simple Power Analysis Attacks for IoT Applications
title Fast Constant-Time Modular Inversion over [Formula: see text] Resistant to Simple Power Analysis Attacks for IoT Applications
title_full Fast Constant-Time Modular Inversion over [Formula: see text] Resistant to Simple Power Analysis Attacks for IoT Applications
title_fullStr Fast Constant-Time Modular Inversion over [Formula: see text] Resistant to Simple Power Analysis Attacks for IoT Applications
title_full_unstemmed Fast Constant-Time Modular Inversion over [Formula: see text] Resistant to Simple Power Analysis Attacks for IoT Applications
title_short Fast Constant-Time Modular Inversion over [Formula: see text] Resistant to Simple Power Analysis Attacks for IoT Applications
title_sort fast constant-time modular inversion over [formula: see text] resistant to simple power analysis attacks for iot applications
topic Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9002486/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35408148
http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/s22072535
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