Cargando…

Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Green Housing Market Subject Behavior in China

In China, driven by the national “3060” double carbon targets (i.e., reaching peak carbon emissions by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060), green housing has become one of the major fields to reduce carbon emissions, facilitating the achievement of the double carbon targets. Promoting the growth of...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Qian, Yingmiao, Yu, Mengyuan, Wang, Tao, Yuan, Ruijia, Feng, Zhenan, Zhao, Xing
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Hindawi 2022
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9005269/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35422856
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/7153270
_version_ 1784686421330624512
author Qian, Yingmiao
Yu, Mengyuan
Wang, Tao
Yuan, Ruijia
Feng, Zhenan
Zhao, Xing
author_facet Qian, Yingmiao
Yu, Mengyuan
Wang, Tao
Yuan, Ruijia
Feng, Zhenan
Zhao, Xing
author_sort Qian, Yingmiao
collection PubMed
description In China, driven by the national “3060” double carbon targets (i.e., reaching peak carbon emissions by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060), green housing has become one of the major fields to reduce carbon emissions, facilitating the achievement of the double carbon targets. Promoting the growth of green housing is an important way for the real estate industry to achieve low-carbon transformation and improve the quality of housing. Meanwhile, the construction industry also can benefit from green housing to achieve its energy conservation and emission reduction targets. Therefore, it is critical to boost and maintain the sustainable growth of the green housing market in China. However, the literature has not focused attention on the market behavior of the green housing market in China. This study proposes a tripartite evolutionary game model to investigate the subject behavior of the green housing market in China. This model consists of three major subjects in a green housing market: developers, consumers, and governments. Based on this model, this study analyzes the stability of the strategy options for each stakeholder and identifies the stable conditions of strategy portfolios to reach the equilibrium points of the game system. The validity of the proposed tripartite evolutionary game model is tested through the simulation of the impacts from various factors on system evolution. According to the impacts of factors and the stable conditions of strategies, this paper puts forward relevant policy suggestions for the healthy and sustainable growth of China's green housing market.
format Online
Article
Text
id pubmed-9005269
institution National Center for Biotechnology Information
language English
publishDate 2022
publisher Hindawi
record_format MEDLINE/PubMed
spelling pubmed-90052692022-04-13 Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Green Housing Market Subject Behavior in China Qian, Yingmiao Yu, Mengyuan Wang, Tao Yuan, Ruijia Feng, Zhenan Zhao, Xing Comput Intell Neurosci Research Article In China, driven by the national “3060” double carbon targets (i.e., reaching peak carbon emissions by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060), green housing has become one of the major fields to reduce carbon emissions, facilitating the achievement of the double carbon targets. Promoting the growth of green housing is an important way for the real estate industry to achieve low-carbon transformation and improve the quality of housing. Meanwhile, the construction industry also can benefit from green housing to achieve its energy conservation and emission reduction targets. Therefore, it is critical to boost and maintain the sustainable growth of the green housing market in China. However, the literature has not focused attention on the market behavior of the green housing market in China. This study proposes a tripartite evolutionary game model to investigate the subject behavior of the green housing market in China. This model consists of three major subjects in a green housing market: developers, consumers, and governments. Based on this model, this study analyzes the stability of the strategy options for each stakeholder and identifies the stable conditions of strategy portfolios to reach the equilibrium points of the game system. The validity of the proposed tripartite evolutionary game model is tested through the simulation of the impacts from various factors on system evolution. According to the impacts of factors and the stable conditions of strategies, this paper puts forward relevant policy suggestions for the healthy and sustainable growth of China's green housing market. Hindawi 2022-04-05 /pmc/articles/PMC9005269/ /pubmed/35422856 http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/7153270 Text en Copyright © 2022 Yingmiao Qian et al. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
spellingShingle Research Article
Qian, Yingmiao
Yu, Mengyuan
Wang, Tao
Yuan, Ruijia
Feng, Zhenan
Zhao, Xing
Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Green Housing Market Subject Behavior in China
title Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Green Housing Market Subject Behavior in China
title_full Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Green Housing Market Subject Behavior in China
title_fullStr Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Green Housing Market Subject Behavior in China
title_full_unstemmed Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Green Housing Market Subject Behavior in China
title_short Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Green Housing Market Subject Behavior in China
title_sort evolutionary game and simulation of green housing market subject behavior in china
topic Research Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9005269/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35422856
http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/7153270
work_keys_str_mv AT qianyingmiao evolutionarygameandsimulationofgreenhousingmarketsubjectbehaviorinchina
AT yumengyuan evolutionarygameandsimulationofgreenhousingmarketsubjectbehaviorinchina
AT wangtao evolutionarygameandsimulationofgreenhousingmarketsubjectbehaviorinchina
AT yuanruijia evolutionarygameandsimulationofgreenhousingmarketsubjectbehaviorinchina
AT fengzhenan evolutionarygameandsimulationofgreenhousingmarketsubjectbehaviorinchina
AT zhaoxing evolutionarygameandsimulationofgreenhousingmarketsubjectbehaviorinchina