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Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Green Housing Market Subject Behavior in China
In China, driven by the national “3060” double carbon targets (i.e., reaching peak carbon emissions by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060), green housing has become one of the major fields to reduce carbon emissions, facilitating the achievement of the double carbon targets. Promoting the growth of...
Autores principales: | , , , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Hindawi
2022
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9005269/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35422856 http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/7153270 |
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author | Qian, Yingmiao Yu, Mengyuan Wang, Tao Yuan, Ruijia Feng, Zhenan Zhao, Xing |
author_facet | Qian, Yingmiao Yu, Mengyuan Wang, Tao Yuan, Ruijia Feng, Zhenan Zhao, Xing |
author_sort | Qian, Yingmiao |
collection | PubMed |
description | In China, driven by the national “3060” double carbon targets (i.e., reaching peak carbon emissions by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060), green housing has become one of the major fields to reduce carbon emissions, facilitating the achievement of the double carbon targets. Promoting the growth of green housing is an important way for the real estate industry to achieve low-carbon transformation and improve the quality of housing. Meanwhile, the construction industry also can benefit from green housing to achieve its energy conservation and emission reduction targets. Therefore, it is critical to boost and maintain the sustainable growth of the green housing market in China. However, the literature has not focused attention on the market behavior of the green housing market in China. This study proposes a tripartite evolutionary game model to investigate the subject behavior of the green housing market in China. This model consists of three major subjects in a green housing market: developers, consumers, and governments. Based on this model, this study analyzes the stability of the strategy options for each stakeholder and identifies the stable conditions of strategy portfolios to reach the equilibrium points of the game system. The validity of the proposed tripartite evolutionary game model is tested through the simulation of the impacts from various factors on system evolution. According to the impacts of factors and the stable conditions of strategies, this paper puts forward relevant policy suggestions for the healthy and sustainable growth of China's green housing market. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-9005269 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2022 |
publisher | Hindawi |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-90052692022-04-13 Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Green Housing Market Subject Behavior in China Qian, Yingmiao Yu, Mengyuan Wang, Tao Yuan, Ruijia Feng, Zhenan Zhao, Xing Comput Intell Neurosci Research Article In China, driven by the national “3060” double carbon targets (i.e., reaching peak carbon emissions by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060), green housing has become one of the major fields to reduce carbon emissions, facilitating the achievement of the double carbon targets. Promoting the growth of green housing is an important way for the real estate industry to achieve low-carbon transformation and improve the quality of housing. Meanwhile, the construction industry also can benefit from green housing to achieve its energy conservation and emission reduction targets. Therefore, it is critical to boost and maintain the sustainable growth of the green housing market in China. However, the literature has not focused attention on the market behavior of the green housing market in China. This study proposes a tripartite evolutionary game model to investigate the subject behavior of the green housing market in China. This model consists of three major subjects in a green housing market: developers, consumers, and governments. Based on this model, this study analyzes the stability of the strategy options for each stakeholder and identifies the stable conditions of strategy portfolios to reach the equilibrium points of the game system. The validity of the proposed tripartite evolutionary game model is tested through the simulation of the impacts from various factors on system evolution. According to the impacts of factors and the stable conditions of strategies, this paper puts forward relevant policy suggestions for the healthy and sustainable growth of China's green housing market. Hindawi 2022-04-05 /pmc/articles/PMC9005269/ /pubmed/35422856 http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/7153270 Text en Copyright © 2022 Yingmiao Qian et al. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. |
spellingShingle | Research Article Qian, Yingmiao Yu, Mengyuan Wang, Tao Yuan, Ruijia Feng, Zhenan Zhao, Xing Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Green Housing Market Subject Behavior in China |
title | Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Green Housing Market Subject Behavior in China |
title_full | Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Green Housing Market Subject Behavior in China |
title_fullStr | Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Green Housing Market Subject Behavior in China |
title_full_unstemmed | Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Green Housing Market Subject Behavior in China |
title_short | Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Green Housing Market Subject Behavior in China |
title_sort | evolutionary game and simulation of green housing market subject behavior in china |
topic | Research Article |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9005269/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35422856 http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/7153270 |
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