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Adversarial robustness assessment: Why in evaluation both L(0) and L(∞) attacks are necessary

There are different types of adversarial attacks and defences for machine learning algorithms which makes assessing the robustness of an algorithm a daunting task. Moreover, there is an intrinsic bias in these adversarial attacks and defences to make matters worse. Here, we organise the problems fac...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Kotyan, Shashank, Vargas, Danilo Vasconcellos
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Public Library of Science 2022
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9009601/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35421125
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0265723
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author Kotyan, Shashank
Vargas, Danilo Vasconcellos
author_facet Kotyan, Shashank
Vargas, Danilo Vasconcellos
author_sort Kotyan, Shashank
collection PubMed
description There are different types of adversarial attacks and defences for machine learning algorithms which makes assessing the robustness of an algorithm a daunting task. Moreover, there is an intrinsic bias in these adversarial attacks and defences to make matters worse. Here, we organise the problems faced: a) Model Dependence, b) Insufficient Evaluation, c) False Adversarial Samples, and d) Perturbation Dependent Results. Based on this, we propose a model agnostic adversarial robustness assessment method based on L(0) and L(∞) distance-based norms and the concept of robustness levels to tackle the problems. We validate our robustness assessment on several neural network architectures (WideResNet, ResNet, AllConv, DenseNet, NIN, LeNet and CapsNet) and adversarial defences for image classification problem. The proposed robustness assessment reveals that the robustness may vary significantly depending on the metric used (i.e., L(0) or L(∞)). Hence, the duality should be taken into account for a correct evaluation. Moreover, a mathematical derivation and a counter-example suggest that L(1) and L(2) metrics alone are not sufficient to avoid spurious adversarial samples. Interestingly, the threshold attack of the proposed assessment is a novel L(∞) black-box adversarial method which requires even more minor perturbation than the One-Pixel Attack (only 12% of One-Pixel Attack’s amount of perturbation) to achieve similar results. We further show that all current networks and defences are vulnerable at all levels of robustness, suggesting that current networks and defences are only effective against a few attacks keeping the models vulnerable to different types of attacks.
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spelling pubmed-90096012022-04-15 Adversarial robustness assessment: Why in evaluation both L(0) and L(∞) attacks are necessary Kotyan, Shashank Vargas, Danilo Vasconcellos PLoS One Research Article There are different types of adversarial attacks and defences for machine learning algorithms which makes assessing the robustness of an algorithm a daunting task. Moreover, there is an intrinsic bias in these adversarial attacks and defences to make matters worse. Here, we organise the problems faced: a) Model Dependence, b) Insufficient Evaluation, c) False Adversarial Samples, and d) Perturbation Dependent Results. Based on this, we propose a model agnostic adversarial robustness assessment method based on L(0) and L(∞) distance-based norms and the concept of robustness levels to tackle the problems. We validate our robustness assessment on several neural network architectures (WideResNet, ResNet, AllConv, DenseNet, NIN, LeNet and CapsNet) and adversarial defences for image classification problem. The proposed robustness assessment reveals that the robustness may vary significantly depending on the metric used (i.e., L(0) or L(∞)). Hence, the duality should be taken into account for a correct evaluation. Moreover, a mathematical derivation and a counter-example suggest that L(1) and L(2) metrics alone are not sufficient to avoid spurious adversarial samples. Interestingly, the threshold attack of the proposed assessment is a novel L(∞) black-box adversarial method which requires even more minor perturbation than the One-Pixel Attack (only 12% of One-Pixel Attack’s amount of perturbation) to achieve similar results. We further show that all current networks and defences are vulnerable at all levels of robustness, suggesting that current networks and defences are only effective against a few attacks keeping the models vulnerable to different types of attacks. Public Library of Science 2022-04-14 /pmc/articles/PMC9009601/ /pubmed/35421125 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0265723 Text en © 2022 Kotyan, Vargas https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) , which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
spellingShingle Research Article
Kotyan, Shashank
Vargas, Danilo Vasconcellos
Adversarial robustness assessment: Why in evaluation both L(0) and L(∞) attacks are necessary
title Adversarial robustness assessment: Why in evaluation both L(0) and L(∞) attacks are necessary
title_full Adversarial robustness assessment: Why in evaluation both L(0) and L(∞) attacks are necessary
title_fullStr Adversarial robustness assessment: Why in evaluation both L(0) and L(∞) attacks are necessary
title_full_unstemmed Adversarial robustness assessment: Why in evaluation both L(0) and L(∞) attacks are necessary
title_short Adversarial robustness assessment: Why in evaluation both L(0) and L(∞) attacks are necessary
title_sort adversarial robustness assessment: why in evaluation both l(0) and l(∞) attacks are necessary
topic Research Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9009601/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35421125
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0265723
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