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Opening up safely: public health system requirements for ongoing COVID-19 management based on evaluation of Australia’s surveillance system performance

BACKGROUND: Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) community transmission was eliminated in Australia from 1/11/2020 to 30/6/2021, allowing evaluation of surveillance system performance in detecting novel outbreaks, including against variants of concern (VoCs). This paper aims...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Lokuge, Kamalini, D’Onise, Katina, Banks, Emily, Street, Tatum, Jantos, Sydney, Baptista, Mohana, Glass, Kathryn
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: BioMed Central 2022
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9010199/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35421989
http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12916-022-02344-x
Descripción
Sumario:BACKGROUND: Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) community transmission was eliminated in Australia from 1/11/2020 to 30/6/2021, allowing evaluation of surveillance system performance in detecting novel outbreaks, including against variants of concern (VoCs). This paper aims to define system requirements for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) surveillance under future transmission and response scenarios, based on surveillance system performance to date. METHODS: This study described and evaluated surveillance systems and epidemiological characteristics of novel outbreaks based on publicly available data, and assessed surveillance system sensitivity and timeliness in outbreak detection. These findings were integrated with analysis of other critical COVID-19 public health measures to establish future COVID-19 management requirements. RESULTS: Twenty-five epidemiologically distinct outbreaks and five distinct clusters were identified in the study period, all linked through genomic sequencing to novel introductions from international travellers. Seventy percent (21/30) were detected through community testing of people with acute respiratory illness, and 30% (9/30) through quarantine screening. On average, 2.07% of the State population was tested in the week preceding detection for those identified through community surveillance. From 17/30 with publicly available data, the average time from seeding to detection was 4.9 days. One outbreak was preceded by unexpected positive wastewater results. Twenty of the 24 outbreaks in 2021 had publicly available sequencing data, all of which identified VoCs. A surveillance strategy for future VoCs similar to that used for detecting SARS-CoV-2 would require a 100–1000-fold increase in genomic sequencing capacity compared to the study period. Other essential requirements are maintaining outbreak response capacity and developing capacity to rapidly engineer, manufacture, and distribute variant vaccines at scale. CONCLUSIONS: Australia’s surveillance systems performed well in detecting novel introduction of SARS-CoV-2 while community transmission was eliminated; introductions were infrequent and case numbers were low. Detection relied on quarantine screening and community surveillance in symptomatic members of the general population, supported by comprehensive genomic sequencing. Once vaccine coverage is maximised, future COVID-19 control should shift to detection of SARS-CoV-2 VoCs, requiring maintenance of surveillance systems and testing all international arrivals, alongside greatly increased genomic sequencing capacity. Effective government support of localised public health response mechanisms and engagement of all sectors of the community is crucial to current and future COVID-19 management. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s12916-022-02344-x.