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Motivations to reciprocate cooperation and punish defection are calibrated by estimates of how easily others can switch partners

Evolutionary models of dyadic cooperation demonstrate that selection favors different strategies for reciprocity depending on opportunities to choose alternative partners. We propose that selection has favored mechanisms that estimate the extent to which others can switch partners and calibrate moti...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Arai, Sakura, Tooby, John, Cosmides, Leda
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Public Library of Science 2022
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9017931/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35439276
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0267153
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author Arai, Sakura
Tooby, John
Cosmides, Leda
author_facet Arai, Sakura
Tooby, John
Cosmides, Leda
author_sort Arai, Sakura
collection PubMed
description Evolutionary models of dyadic cooperation demonstrate that selection favors different strategies for reciprocity depending on opportunities to choose alternative partners. We propose that selection has favored mechanisms that estimate the extent to which others can switch partners and calibrate motivations to reciprocate and punish accordingly. These estimates should reflect default assumptions about relational mobility: the probability that individuals in one’s social world will have the opportunity to form relationships with new partners. This prior probability can be updated by cues present in the immediate situation one is facing. The resulting estimate of a partner’s outside options should serve as input to motivational systems regulating reciprocity: Higher estimates should down-regulate the use of sanctions to prevent defection by a current partner, and up-regulate efforts to attract better cooperative partners by curating one’s own reputation and monitoring that of others. We tested this hypothesis using a Trust Game with Punishment (TGP), which provides continuous measures of reciprocity, defection, and punishment in response to defection. We measured each participant’s perception of relational mobility in their real-world social ecology and experimentally varied a cue to partner switching. Moreover, the study was conducted in the US (n = 519) and Japan (n = 520): societies that are high versus low in relational mobility. Across conditions and societies, higher perceptions of relational mobility were associated with increased reciprocity and decreased punishment: i.e., those who thought that others have many opportunities to find new partners reciprocated more and punished less. The situational cue to partner switching was detected, but relational mobility in one’s real social world regulated motivations to reciprocate and punish, even in the experimental setting. The current research provides evidence that motivational systems are designed to estimate varying degrees of partner choice in one’s social ecology and regulate reciprocal behaviors accordingly.
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spelling pubmed-90179312022-04-20 Motivations to reciprocate cooperation and punish defection are calibrated by estimates of how easily others can switch partners Arai, Sakura Tooby, John Cosmides, Leda PLoS One Research Article Evolutionary models of dyadic cooperation demonstrate that selection favors different strategies for reciprocity depending on opportunities to choose alternative partners. We propose that selection has favored mechanisms that estimate the extent to which others can switch partners and calibrate motivations to reciprocate and punish accordingly. These estimates should reflect default assumptions about relational mobility: the probability that individuals in one’s social world will have the opportunity to form relationships with new partners. This prior probability can be updated by cues present in the immediate situation one is facing. The resulting estimate of a partner’s outside options should serve as input to motivational systems regulating reciprocity: Higher estimates should down-regulate the use of sanctions to prevent defection by a current partner, and up-regulate efforts to attract better cooperative partners by curating one’s own reputation and monitoring that of others. We tested this hypothesis using a Trust Game with Punishment (TGP), which provides continuous measures of reciprocity, defection, and punishment in response to defection. We measured each participant’s perception of relational mobility in their real-world social ecology and experimentally varied a cue to partner switching. Moreover, the study was conducted in the US (n = 519) and Japan (n = 520): societies that are high versus low in relational mobility. Across conditions and societies, higher perceptions of relational mobility were associated with increased reciprocity and decreased punishment: i.e., those who thought that others have many opportunities to find new partners reciprocated more and punished less. The situational cue to partner switching was detected, but relational mobility in one’s real social world regulated motivations to reciprocate and punish, even in the experimental setting. The current research provides evidence that motivational systems are designed to estimate varying degrees of partner choice in one’s social ecology and regulate reciprocal behaviors accordingly. Public Library of Science 2022-04-19 /pmc/articles/PMC9017931/ /pubmed/35439276 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0267153 Text en © 2022 Arai et al https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) , which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
spellingShingle Research Article
Arai, Sakura
Tooby, John
Cosmides, Leda
Motivations to reciprocate cooperation and punish defection are calibrated by estimates of how easily others can switch partners
title Motivations to reciprocate cooperation and punish defection are calibrated by estimates of how easily others can switch partners
title_full Motivations to reciprocate cooperation and punish defection are calibrated by estimates of how easily others can switch partners
title_fullStr Motivations to reciprocate cooperation and punish defection are calibrated by estimates of how easily others can switch partners
title_full_unstemmed Motivations to reciprocate cooperation and punish defection are calibrated by estimates of how easily others can switch partners
title_short Motivations to reciprocate cooperation and punish defection are calibrated by estimates of how easily others can switch partners
title_sort motivations to reciprocate cooperation and punish defection are calibrated by estimates of how easily others can switch partners
topic Research Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9017931/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35439276
http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0267153
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