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Motivations to reciprocate cooperation and punish defection are calibrated by estimates of how easily others can switch partners
Evolutionary models of dyadic cooperation demonstrate that selection favors different strategies for reciprocity depending on opportunities to choose alternative partners. We propose that selection has favored mechanisms that estimate the extent to which others can switch partners and calibrate moti...
Autores principales: | Arai, Sakura, Tooby, John, Cosmides, Leda |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
Public Library of Science
2022
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9017931/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35439276 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0267153 |
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