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Exploring an Efficient Evolutionary Game Model for the Government–Enterprise–Public during the Double Carbon Policy in China
The realization of China’s “double carbon” goal is of great significance to the world environment and China’s economy and society. Through the establishment of the “government–enterprise–public” evolutionary game model, this paper explores the interaction between government policy guidance, low-carb...
Autores principales: | , , , , , |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
MDPI
2022
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9033048/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35457481 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19084607 |
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author | Zou, Bilin Ju, Chunhua Bao, Fuguang Lai, Ye Xu, Chonghuan Zhu, Yiwen |
author_facet | Zou, Bilin Ju, Chunhua Bao, Fuguang Lai, Ye Xu, Chonghuan Zhu, Yiwen |
author_sort | Zou, Bilin |
collection | PubMed |
description | The realization of China’s “double carbon” goal is of great significance to the world environment and China’s economy and society. Through the establishment of the “government–enterprise–public” evolutionary game model, this paper explores the interaction between government policy guidance, low-carbon technology R&D behavior of enterprises, and public purchase of carbon label products, as well as the micro-driving path, aiming to provide suggestions for the implementation of the “double carbon” policy and carbon label system in China. The results show that the choice of government, enterprises, and public strategies is closely related to their own costs and benefits. Public sentiment can effectively urge the government to actively fulfill its responsibilities. Effective government policy guidance plays a key role in low-carbon technology R&D behavior of enterprises. There is an interaction between low-carbon technology R&D behavior of enterprises and public purchase of carbon label products. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-9033048 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2022 |
publisher | MDPI |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-90330482022-04-23 Exploring an Efficient Evolutionary Game Model for the Government–Enterprise–Public during the Double Carbon Policy in China Zou, Bilin Ju, Chunhua Bao, Fuguang Lai, Ye Xu, Chonghuan Zhu, Yiwen Int J Environ Res Public Health Article The realization of China’s “double carbon” goal is of great significance to the world environment and China’s economy and society. Through the establishment of the “government–enterprise–public” evolutionary game model, this paper explores the interaction between government policy guidance, low-carbon technology R&D behavior of enterprises, and public purchase of carbon label products, as well as the micro-driving path, aiming to provide suggestions for the implementation of the “double carbon” policy and carbon label system in China. The results show that the choice of government, enterprises, and public strategies is closely related to their own costs and benefits. Public sentiment can effectively urge the government to actively fulfill its responsibilities. Effective government policy guidance plays a key role in low-carbon technology R&D behavior of enterprises. There is an interaction between low-carbon technology R&D behavior of enterprises and public purchase of carbon label products. MDPI 2022-04-11 /pmc/articles/PMC9033048/ /pubmed/35457481 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19084607 Text en © 2022 by the authors. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). |
spellingShingle | Article Zou, Bilin Ju, Chunhua Bao, Fuguang Lai, Ye Xu, Chonghuan Zhu, Yiwen Exploring an Efficient Evolutionary Game Model for the Government–Enterprise–Public during the Double Carbon Policy in China |
title | Exploring an Efficient Evolutionary Game Model for the Government–Enterprise–Public during the Double Carbon Policy in China |
title_full | Exploring an Efficient Evolutionary Game Model for the Government–Enterprise–Public during the Double Carbon Policy in China |
title_fullStr | Exploring an Efficient Evolutionary Game Model for the Government–Enterprise–Public during the Double Carbon Policy in China |
title_full_unstemmed | Exploring an Efficient Evolutionary Game Model for the Government–Enterprise–Public during the Double Carbon Policy in China |
title_short | Exploring an Efficient Evolutionary Game Model for the Government–Enterprise–Public during the Double Carbon Policy in China |
title_sort | exploring an efficient evolutionary game model for the government–enterprise–public during the double carbon policy in china |
topic | Article |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9033048/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35457481 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19084607 |
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