The Effects of Social Distance and Asymmetric Reward and Punishment on Individual Cooperative Behavior in Dilemma Situations

The behavior decisions in social dilemmas are highlighted in sociological, economic, and social psychological studies. Across two studies, the iterated prisoner’s dilemma is used as a basic paradigm to explore the effects of social distance and asymmetric reward and punishment on an individual’s cooperative behavior. Experiment 1 (N = 80) used a 2 (social distance: intimacy vs. strangeness) × 2 (symmetry of rewards: symmetric rewards vs. asymmetric rewards) within-subject design and demonstrated that when there were only two options, namely, cooperation and defection, cooperative behavior was influenced by social distance and symmetry of rewards, respectively, and the interaction was not significant. Experiment 2 (N = 80) used a 2 (social distance: intimacy vs. strangeness) × 2 (symmetry of punishment: symmetric punishment vs. asymmetric punishment) within-subject design and showed that the cooperative behavior of participants decreased when the punishment option was added, and the two levels of symmetry and asymmetry were set. Specifically, compared with the symmetric punishment group, the asymmetric punishment group was more likely to choose a defection strategy and less likely to use a punishment strategy. Moreover, there was a marginal interaction effect between social distance and symmetry of punishment, and symmetry of punishment was a significant mediator in the relationship between social distance and individual cooperation. Specifically, asymmetric punishment reduced only the cooperation rate (CR) between participants and their friends. In conclusion, in dilemma situations, asymmetric reward did not influence individual cooperative behavior at different social distances, while asymmetric punishment did, because the sense of loss was more likely to awaken an individual’s social comparison motives.