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Evolutionary Game Analysis of Construction Workers' Unsafe Behaviors Based on Incentive and Punishment Mechanisms

Construction is one of the most dangerous industries because of its open working environment and risky construction conditions. In the process of construction, risk events cause great losses for owners and workers. Most of the risk events are closely related to unsafe behaviors of workers. Therefore...

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Autores principales: Zhu, Jianbo, Zhang, Ce, Wang, Shuyi, Yuan, Jingfeng, Li, Qiming
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Frontiers Media S.A. 2022
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9172908/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35686084
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.907382
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author Zhu, Jianbo
Zhang, Ce
Wang, Shuyi
Yuan, Jingfeng
Li, Qiming
author_facet Zhu, Jianbo
Zhang, Ce
Wang, Shuyi
Yuan, Jingfeng
Li, Qiming
author_sort Zhu, Jianbo
collection PubMed
description Construction is one of the most dangerous industries because of its open working environment and risky construction conditions. In the process of construction, risk events cause great losses for owners and workers. Most of the risk events are closely related to unsafe behaviors of workers. Therefore, it is of great significance for contractors to establish management measures, e.g., incentive and punishment mechanism, to induce workers to reduce unsafe behaviors. This paper aims to take the incentive and punishment mechanism into consideration and develop an evolutionary game model to improve the effectiveness of safety management. The evolutionary stability strategies which can help reduce unsafe behaviors are obtained and analyzed. Results show that there are 12 equilibrium strategies under the condition of different parameters. Specifically, the incentive and punishment mechanism has played an important role for the evolution direction. A balanced incentive and punishment mechanism for the investment and positive stimulus for workers can effectively promote both sides to take positive behaviors, and then realize good evolutionary stable situations. In addition, the initial perceptions of both sides have a decisive impact on the evolution direction. Strengthening communication with the mutual trust between both sides can improve safety performance of both sides. This study is valuable for contractors to design appropriate incentive and punishment measures and establish relevant strategies to promote safe behaviors of construction workers.
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spelling pubmed-91729082022-06-08 Evolutionary Game Analysis of Construction Workers' Unsafe Behaviors Based on Incentive and Punishment Mechanisms Zhu, Jianbo Zhang, Ce Wang, Shuyi Yuan, Jingfeng Li, Qiming Front Psychol Psychology Construction is one of the most dangerous industries because of its open working environment and risky construction conditions. In the process of construction, risk events cause great losses for owners and workers. Most of the risk events are closely related to unsafe behaviors of workers. Therefore, it is of great significance for contractors to establish management measures, e.g., incentive and punishment mechanism, to induce workers to reduce unsafe behaviors. This paper aims to take the incentive and punishment mechanism into consideration and develop an evolutionary game model to improve the effectiveness of safety management. The evolutionary stability strategies which can help reduce unsafe behaviors are obtained and analyzed. Results show that there are 12 equilibrium strategies under the condition of different parameters. Specifically, the incentive and punishment mechanism has played an important role for the evolution direction. A balanced incentive and punishment mechanism for the investment and positive stimulus for workers can effectively promote both sides to take positive behaviors, and then realize good evolutionary stable situations. In addition, the initial perceptions of both sides have a decisive impact on the evolution direction. Strengthening communication with the mutual trust between both sides can improve safety performance of both sides. This study is valuable for contractors to design appropriate incentive and punishment measures and establish relevant strategies to promote safe behaviors of construction workers. Frontiers Media S.A. 2022-05-24 /pmc/articles/PMC9172908/ /pubmed/35686084 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.907382 Text en Copyright © 2022 Zhu, Zhang, Wang, Yuan and Li. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
spellingShingle Psychology
Zhu, Jianbo
Zhang, Ce
Wang, Shuyi
Yuan, Jingfeng
Li, Qiming
Evolutionary Game Analysis of Construction Workers' Unsafe Behaviors Based on Incentive and Punishment Mechanisms
title Evolutionary Game Analysis of Construction Workers' Unsafe Behaviors Based on Incentive and Punishment Mechanisms
title_full Evolutionary Game Analysis of Construction Workers' Unsafe Behaviors Based on Incentive and Punishment Mechanisms
title_fullStr Evolutionary Game Analysis of Construction Workers' Unsafe Behaviors Based on Incentive and Punishment Mechanisms
title_full_unstemmed Evolutionary Game Analysis of Construction Workers' Unsafe Behaviors Based on Incentive and Punishment Mechanisms
title_short Evolutionary Game Analysis of Construction Workers' Unsafe Behaviors Based on Incentive and Punishment Mechanisms
title_sort evolutionary game analysis of construction workers' unsafe behaviors based on incentive and punishment mechanisms
topic Psychology
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9172908/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35686084
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.907382
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