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A Game Theoretic Analysis of Competition Between Vaccine and Drug Companies during Disease Contraction and Recovery
BACKGROUND: Infectious diseases such as COVID-19 and HIV/AIDS are behaviorally challenging for persons, vaccine and drug companies, and donors. METHODS: In 3 linked games in which a disease may or may not be contracted, [Formula: see text] persons choose risky or safe behavior (game 1). Two vaccine...
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
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SAGE Publications
2021
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Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9189729/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34738510 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0272989X211053563 |
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author | Hausken, Kjell Ncube, Mthuli |
author_facet | Hausken, Kjell Ncube, Mthuli |
author_sort | Hausken, Kjell |
collection | PubMed |
description | BACKGROUND: Infectious diseases such as COVID-19 and HIV/AIDS are behaviorally challenging for persons, vaccine and drug companies, and donors. METHODS: In 3 linked games in which a disease may or may not be contracted, [Formula: see text] persons choose risky or safe behavior (game 1). Two vaccine companies (game 2) and 2 drug companies (game 3) choose whether to develop vaccines and drugs. Each person chooses whether to buy 1 vaccine (if no disease contraction) or 1 drug (if disease contraction). A donor subsidizes vaccine and drug developments and purchases. Nature probabilistically chooses disease contraction, recovery versus death with and without each drug, and whether vaccines and drugs are developed successfully. COVID-19 data are used for parameter estimation. RESULTS: Each person chooses risky behavior if its utility outweighs safe behavior, accounting for nature’s probability of disease contraction which depends on how many are vaccinated. Each person buys a vaccine or drug if the companies produce them and if their utilities (accounting for side effects and virus mutation) outweigh the costs, which may be subsidized by a sponsor. DISCUSSION: Drug purchases depend on nature’s recovery probability exceeding the probability in the absence of a drug. Each company develops and produces a vaccine or drug if nature’s probability of successful development is high, if sufficiently many persons buy the vaccine or drug at a sales price that sufficiently exceeds the production price, and if the donor sponsors. CONCLUSION: Accounting for all players’ interlinked decisions allowing 14 outcomes, which is challenging without a game theoretic analysis, the donor maximizes all persons’ expected utilities at the societal level to adjust how persons’ purchases and the companies’ development and production are subsidized. HIGHLIGHTS: A game theoretic approach can help explain the production decisions of vaccine and drug companies, and the decisions of persons and a donor, impacted by Nature. In 3 linked games, N persons choose risky behavior if its utility outweighs safe behavior. Vaccine and drug companies develop vaccines and drugs sponsored by a donor if profitable, allowing 14 outcomes. |
format | Online Article Text |
id | pubmed-9189729 |
institution | National Center for Biotechnology Information |
language | English |
publishDate | 2021 |
publisher | SAGE Publications |
record_format | MEDLINE/PubMed |
spelling | pubmed-91897292022-06-14 A Game Theoretic Analysis of Competition Between Vaccine and Drug Companies during Disease Contraction and Recovery Hausken, Kjell Ncube, Mthuli Med Decis Making Original Research Articles BACKGROUND: Infectious diseases such as COVID-19 and HIV/AIDS are behaviorally challenging for persons, vaccine and drug companies, and donors. METHODS: In 3 linked games in which a disease may or may not be contracted, [Formula: see text] persons choose risky or safe behavior (game 1). Two vaccine companies (game 2) and 2 drug companies (game 3) choose whether to develop vaccines and drugs. Each person chooses whether to buy 1 vaccine (if no disease contraction) or 1 drug (if disease contraction). A donor subsidizes vaccine and drug developments and purchases. Nature probabilistically chooses disease contraction, recovery versus death with and without each drug, and whether vaccines and drugs are developed successfully. COVID-19 data are used for parameter estimation. RESULTS: Each person chooses risky behavior if its utility outweighs safe behavior, accounting for nature’s probability of disease contraction which depends on how many are vaccinated. Each person buys a vaccine or drug if the companies produce them and if their utilities (accounting for side effects and virus mutation) outweigh the costs, which may be subsidized by a sponsor. DISCUSSION: Drug purchases depend on nature’s recovery probability exceeding the probability in the absence of a drug. Each company develops and produces a vaccine or drug if nature’s probability of successful development is high, if sufficiently many persons buy the vaccine or drug at a sales price that sufficiently exceeds the production price, and if the donor sponsors. CONCLUSION: Accounting for all players’ interlinked decisions allowing 14 outcomes, which is challenging without a game theoretic analysis, the donor maximizes all persons’ expected utilities at the societal level to adjust how persons’ purchases and the companies’ development and production are subsidized. HIGHLIGHTS: A game theoretic approach can help explain the production decisions of vaccine and drug companies, and the decisions of persons and a donor, impacted by Nature. In 3 linked games, N persons choose risky behavior if its utility outweighs safe behavior. Vaccine and drug companies develop vaccines and drugs sponsored by a donor if profitable, allowing 14 outcomes. SAGE Publications 2021-11-05 2022-07 /pmc/articles/PMC9189729/ /pubmed/34738510 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0272989X211053563 Text en © The Author(s) 2021 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits any use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage). |
spellingShingle | Original Research Articles Hausken, Kjell Ncube, Mthuli A Game Theoretic Analysis of Competition Between Vaccine and Drug Companies during Disease Contraction and Recovery |
title | A Game Theoretic Analysis of Competition Between Vaccine and Drug
Companies during Disease Contraction and Recovery |
title_full | A Game Theoretic Analysis of Competition Between Vaccine and Drug
Companies during Disease Contraction and Recovery |
title_fullStr | A Game Theoretic Analysis of Competition Between Vaccine and Drug
Companies during Disease Contraction and Recovery |
title_full_unstemmed | A Game Theoretic Analysis of Competition Between Vaccine and Drug
Companies during Disease Contraction and Recovery |
title_short | A Game Theoretic Analysis of Competition Between Vaccine and Drug
Companies during Disease Contraction and Recovery |
title_sort | game theoretic analysis of competition between vaccine and drug
companies during disease contraction and recovery |
topic | Original Research Articles |
url | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9189729/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34738510 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0272989X211053563 |
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