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Improving Community Health Worker Compensation: A Case Study From India Using Quantitative Projection Modeling and Incentive Design Principles

INTRODUCTION: Although community health workers (CHWs) are effective at mobilizing important health behaviors, there is limited evidence on how financial incentive systems can best be designed to drive their effectiveness. This study intends to bridge this evidence gap by analyzing the compensation...

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Autores principales: Jain, Mokshada, Caplan, Yael, Ramesh, Banadakoppa Manjappa, Kemp, Hannah, Hammer, Bettina, Isac, Shajy, Blanchard, James, Namasivayam, Vasanthakumar, Sgaier, Sema K.
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: Global Health: Science and Practice 2022
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9242609/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36332076
http://dx.doi.org/10.9745/GHSP-D-21-00413
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author Jain, Mokshada
Caplan, Yael
Ramesh, Banadakoppa Manjappa
Kemp, Hannah
Hammer, Bettina
Isac, Shajy
Blanchard, James
Namasivayam, Vasanthakumar
Sgaier, Sema K.
author_facet Jain, Mokshada
Caplan, Yael
Ramesh, Banadakoppa Manjappa
Kemp, Hannah
Hammer, Bettina
Isac, Shajy
Blanchard, James
Namasivayam, Vasanthakumar
Sgaier, Sema K.
author_sort Jain, Mokshada
collection PubMed
description INTRODUCTION: Although community health workers (CHWs) are effective at mobilizing important health behaviors, there is limited evidence on how financial incentive systems can best be designed to drive their effectiveness. This study intends to bridge this evidence gap by analyzing the compensation model of India's accredited social health activist (ASHA) program and identifying areas of improvement in the system's design and implementation. METHODS: We analyze the ASHA program in Uttar Pradesh, India. ASHAs receive compensation through a mix of program-linked, performance-based, and routine activity-based incentive structures. Using multiple data sources, including a novel linked household and ASHA survey, we estimate ASHA performance-linked incentive earnings under different scenarios of ASHA actions and household behaviors. Juxtaposing statistical projection models and actual government payments, we identified which incentives promised the highest payments, which were claimed or not, which could be claimed more by increasing ASHA actions, and which were paid despite not meeting payment criteria. We also report findings on ASHA awareness of and experiences with claiming incentives. RESULTS: We find crucial gaps and implementation challenges in the ASHA incentive structure. ASHAs could double their earnings by completing certain tasks within their control. ASHAs may also be paid for partial completion of activities, as incentives are paid in lump sums for a series of activities rather than for each activity. Family planning incentives have the largest gap between potential and actual earnings. Incentivizing ASHAs for achieving certain health outcomes is inefficient, as no clear linkage was found between the achievability of such health outcomes and the claim amounts. CONCLUSION: There are several opportunities for improving CHW compensation, from improving the incentive claims process to shifting focus to achievable outcomes. Optimizing incentive system designs can further enhance CHW effectiveness globally to affect key health behaviors.
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spelling pubmed-92426092022-07-06 Improving Community Health Worker Compensation: A Case Study From India Using Quantitative Projection Modeling and Incentive Design Principles Jain, Mokshada Caplan, Yael Ramesh, Banadakoppa Manjappa Kemp, Hannah Hammer, Bettina Isac, Shajy Blanchard, James Namasivayam, Vasanthakumar Sgaier, Sema K. Glob Health Sci Pract Original Article INTRODUCTION: Although community health workers (CHWs) are effective at mobilizing important health behaviors, there is limited evidence on how financial incentive systems can best be designed to drive their effectiveness. This study intends to bridge this evidence gap by analyzing the compensation model of India's accredited social health activist (ASHA) program and identifying areas of improvement in the system's design and implementation. METHODS: We analyze the ASHA program in Uttar Pradesh, India. ASHAs receive compensation through a mix of program-linked, performance-based, and routine activity-based incentive structures. Using multiple data sources, including a novel linked household and ASHA survey, we estimate ASHA performance-linked incentive earnings under different scenarios of ASHA actions and household behaviors. Juxtaposing statistical projection models and actual government payments, we identified which incentives promised the highest payments, which were claimed or not, which could be claimed more by increasing ASHA actions, and which were paid despite not meeting payment criteria. We also report findings on ASHA awareness of and experiences with claiming incentives. RESULTS: We find crucial gaps and implementation challenges in the ASHA incentive structure. ASHAs could double their earnings by completing certain tasks within their control. ASHAs may also be paid for partial completion of activities, as incentives are paid in lump sums for a series of activities rather than for each activity. Family planning incentives have the largest gap between potential and actual earnings. Incentivizing ASHAs for achieving certain health outcomes is inefficient, as no clear linkage was found between the achievability of such health outcomes and the claim amounts. CONCLUSION: There are several opportunities for improving CHW compensation, from improving the incentive claims process to shifting focus to achievable outcomes. Optimizing incentive system designs can further enhance CHW effectiveness globally to affect key health behaviors. Global Health: Science and Practice 2022-06-29 /pmc/articles/PMC9242609/ /pubmed/36332076 http://dx.doi.org/10.9745/GHSP-D-21-00413 Text en © Jain et al. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are properly cited. To view a copy of the license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. When linking to this article, please use the following permanent link: https://doi.org/10.9745/GHSP-D-21-00413
spellingShingle Original Article
Jain, Mokshada
Caplan, Yael
Ramesh, Banadakoppa Manjappa
Kemp, Hannah
Hammer, Bettina
Isac, Shajy
Blanchard, James
Namasivayam, Vasanthakumar
Sgaier, Sema K.
Improving Community Health Worker Compensation: A Case Study From India Using Quantitative Projection Modeling and Incentive Design Principles
title Improving Community Health Worker Compensation: A Case Study From India Using Quantitative Projection Modeling and Incentive Design Principles
title_full Improving Community Health Worker Compensation: A Case Study From India Using Quantitative Projection Modeling and Incentive Design Principles
title_fullStr Improving Community Health Worker Compensation: A Case Study From India Using Quantitative Projection Modeling and Incentive Design Principles
title_full_unstemmed Improving Community Health Worker Compensation: A Case Study From India Using Quantitative Projection Modeling and Incentive Design Principles
title_short Improving Community Health Worker Compensation: A Case Study From India Using Quantitative Projection Modeling and Incentive Design Principles
title_sort improving community health worker compensation: a case study from india using quantitative projection modeling and incentive design principles
topic Original Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9242609/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/36332076
http://dx.doi.org/10.9745/GHSP-D-21-00413
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