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Empirical and philosophical problems with the subspecies rank

Species‐level taxonomy derives from empirical sources (data and techniques) that assess the existence of spatiotemporal evolutionary lineages via various species “concepts.” These concepts determine if observed lineages are independent given a particular methodology and ontology, which relates the m...

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Autores principales: Burbrink, Frank T., Crother, Brian I., Murray, Christopher M., Smith, Brian Tilston, Ruane, Sara, Myers, Edward A., Pyron, Robert Alexander
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: John Wiley and Sons Inc. 2022
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9271888/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35845367
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ece3.9069
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author Burbrink, Frank T.
Crother, Brian I.
Murray, Christopher M.
Smith, Brian Tilston
Ruane, Sara
Myers, Edward A.
Pyron, Robert Alexander
author_facet Burbrink, Frank T.
Crother, Brian I.
Murray, Christopher M.
Smith, Brian Tilston
Ruane, Sara
Myers, Edward A.
Pyron, Robert Alexander
author_sort Burbrink, Frank T.
collection PubMed
description Species‐level taxonomy derives from empirical sources (data and techniques) that assess the existence of spatiotemporal evolutionary lineages via various species “concepts.” These concepts determine if observed lineages are independent given a particular methodology and ontology, which relates the metaphysical species concept to what “kind” of thing a species is in reality. Often, species concepts fail to link epistemology back to ontology. This lack of coherence is in part responsible for the persistence of the subspecies rank, which in modern usage often functions as a placeholder between the evolutionary events of divergence or collapse of incipient species. Thus, prospective events like lineages merging or diverging require information from unknowable future information. This is also conditioned on evidence that the lineage already has a detectably distinct evolutionary history. Ranking these lineages as subspecies can seem attractive given that many lineages do not exhibit intrinsic reproductive isolation. We argue that using subspecies is indefensible on philosophical and empirical grounds. Ontologically, the rank of subspecies is either identical to that of species or undefined in the context of evolutionary lineages representing spatiotemporally defined individuals. Some species concepts more inclined to consider subspecies, like the Biological Species Concept, are disconnected from evolutionary ontology and do not consider genealogy. Even if ontology is ignored, methods addressing reproductive isolation are often indirect and fail to capture the range of scenarios linking gene flow to species identity over space and time. The use of subspecies and reliance on reproductive isolation as a basis for an operational species concept can also conflict with ethical issues governing the protection of species. We provide a way forward for recognizing and naming species that links theoretical and operational species concepts regardless of the magnitude of reproductive isolation.
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spelling pubmed-92718882022-07-15 Empirical and philosophical problems with the subspecies rank Burbrink, Frank T. Crother, Brian I. Murray, Christopher M. Smith, Brian Tilston Ruane, Sara Myers, Edward A. Pyron, Robert Alexander Ecol Evol Review Articles Species‐level taxonomy derives from empirical sources (data and techniques) that assess the existence of spatiotemporal evolutionary lineages via various species “concepts.” These concepts determine if observed lineages are independent given a particular methodology and ontology, which relates the metaphysical species concept to what “kind” of thing a species is in reality. Often, species concepts fail to link epistemology back to ontology. This lack of coherence is in part responsible for the persistence of the subspecies rank, which in modern usage often functions as a placeholder between the evolutionary events of divergence or collapse of incipient species. Thus, prospective events like lineages merging or diverging require information from unknowable future information. This is also conditioned on evidence that the lineage already has a detectably distinct evolutionary history. Ranking these lineages as subspecies can seem attractive given that many lineages do not exhibit intrinsic reproductive isolation. We argue that using subspecies is indefensible on philosophical and empirical grounds. Ontologically, the rank of subspecies is either identical to that of species or undefined in the context of evolutionary lineages representing spatiotemporally defined individuals. Some species concepts more inclined to consider subspecies, like the Biological Species Concept, are disconnected from evolutionary ontology and do not consider genealogy. Even if ontology is ignored, methods addressing reproductive isolation are often indirect and fail to capture the range of scenarios linking gene flow to species identity over space and time. The use of subspecies and reliance on reproductive isolation as a basis for an operational species concept can also conflict with ethical issues governing the protection of species. We provide a way forward for recognizing and naming species that links theoretical and operational species concepts regardless of the magnitude of reproductive isolation. John Wiley and Sons Inc. 2022-07-10 /pmc/articles/PMC9271888/ /pubmed/35845367 http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ece3.9069 Text en © 2022 The Authors. Ecology and Evolution published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/This is an open access article under the terms of the http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
spellingShingle Review Articles
Burbrink, Frank T.
Crother, Brian I.
Murray, Christopher M.
Smith, Brian Tilston
Ruane, Sara
Myers, Edward A.
Pyron, Robert Alexander
Empirical and philosophical problems with the subspecies rank
title Empirical and philosophical problems with the subspecies rank
title_full Empirical and philosophical problems with the subspecies rank
title_fullStr Empirical and philosophical problems with the subspecies rank
title_full_unstemmed Empirical and philosophical problems with the subspecies rank
title_short Empirical and philosophical problems with the subspecies rank
title_sort empirical and philosophical problems with the subspecies rank
topic Review Articles
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9271888/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35845367
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ece3.9069
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