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Evaluating the structure-coefficient theorem of evolutionary game theory
In order to accommodate the empirical fact that population structures are rarely simple, modern studies of evolutionary dynamics allow for complicated and highly heterogeneous spatial structures. As a result, one of the most difficult obstacles lies in making analytical deductions, either qualitativ...
Autores principales: | McAvoy, Alex, Wakeley, John |
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Formato: | Online Artículo Texto |
Lenguaje: | English |
Publicado: |
National Academy of Sciences
2022
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9282417/ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35787041 http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2119656119 |
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