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Toward an Account of Intuitive Time

People hold intuitive theories of the physical world, such as theories of matter, energy, and motion, in the sense that they have a coherent conceptual structure supporting a network of beliefs about the domain. It is not yet clear whether people can also be said to hold a shared intuitive theory of...

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Autores principales: Lee, Ruth, Shardlow, Jack, Hoerl, Christoph, O'Connor, Patrick A., Fernandes, Alison S., McCormack, Teresa
Formato: Online Artículo Texto
Lenguaje:English
Publicado: John Wiley and Sons Inc. 2022
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9286814/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35731904
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cogs.13166
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author Lee, Ruth
Shardlow, Jack
Hoerl, Christoph
O'Connor, Patrick A.
Fernandes, Alison S.
McCormack, Teresa
author_facet Lee, Ruth
Shardlow, Jack
Hoerl, Christoph
O'Connor, Patrick A.
Fernandes, Alison S.
McCormack, Teresa
author_sort Lee, Ruth
collection PubMed
description People hold intuitive theories of the physical world, such as theories of matter, energy, and motion, in the sense that they have a coherent conceptual structure supporting a network of beliefs about the domain. It is not yet clear whether people can also be said to hold a shared intuitive theory of time. Yet, philosophical debates about the metaphysical nature of time often revolve around the idea that people hold one or more “common sense” assumptions about time: that there is an objective “now”; that the past, present, and future are fundamentally different in nature; and that time passes or flows. We empirically explored the question of whether people indeed share some or all of these assumptions by asking adults to what extent they agreed with a set of brief statements about time. Across two analyses, subsets of people's beliefs about time were found consistently to covary in ways that suggested stable underlying conceptual dimensions related to aspects of the “common sense” assumptions described by philosophers. However, distinct subsets of participants showed three mutually incompatible profiles of response, the most frequent of which did not closely match all of philosophers’ claims about common sense time. These exploratory studies provide a useful starting point in attempts to characterize intuitive theories of time.
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spelling pubmed-92868142022-07-19 Toward an Account of Intuitive Time Lee, Ruth Shardlow, Jack Hoerl, Christoph O'Connor, Patrick A. Fernandes, Alison S. McCormack, Teresa Cogn Sci Regular Article People hold intuitive theories of the physical world, such as theories of matter, energy, and motion, in the sense that they have a coherent conceptual structure supporting a network of beliefs about the domain. It is not yet clear whether people can also be said to hold a shared intuitive theory of time. Yet, philosophical debates about the metaphysical nature of time often revolve around the idea that people hold one or more “common sense” assumptions about time: that there is an objective “now”; that the past, present, and future are fundamentally different in nature; and that time passes or flows. We empirically explored the question of whether people indeed share some or all of these assumptions by asking adults to what extent they agreed with a set of brief statements about time. Across two analyses, subsets of people's beliefs about time were found consistently to covary in ways that suggested stable underlying conceptual dimensions related to aspects of the “common sense” assumptions described by philosophers. However, distinct subsets of participants showed three mutually incompatible profiles of response, the most frequent of which did not closely match all of philosophers’ claims about common sense time. These exploratory studies provide a useful starting point in attempts to characterize intuitive theories of time. John Wiley and Sons Inc. 2022-06-22 2022-07 /pmc/articles/PMC9286814/ /pubmed/35731904 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cogs.13166 Text en © 2022 The Authors. Cognitive Science published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Cognitive Science Society (CSS). https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/This is an open access article under the terms of the http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
spellingShingle Regular Article
Lee, Ruth
Shardlow, Jack
Hoerl, Christoph
O'Connor, Patrick A.
Fernandes, Alison S.
McCormack, Teresa
Toward an Account of Intuitive Time
title Toward an Account of Intuitive Time
title_full Toward an Account of Intuitive Time
title_fullStr Toward an Account of Intuitive Time
title_full_unstemmed Toward an Account of Intuitive Time
title_short Toward an Account of Intuitive Time
title_sort toward an account of intuitive time
topic Regular Article
url https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9286814/
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35731904
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cogs.13166
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